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OVERPARTICIPATION:  DESIGNING EFFECTIVE 
LAND USE PUBLIC PROCESSES 
Anika Singh Lemar* 
 
There are more opportunities for public participation in the planning and 
zoning process today than there were in the decades immediately after states 
adopted the first zoning enabling acts.  As a result, today, public 
participation, dominated by nearby residents, drives most land use planning 
and zoning decisions.  Enhanced public participation rights are often seen 
as an unqualified good, but there is a long history of public participation and 
community control cementing racial segregation, entrenching exclusion, and 
preventing the development of affordable housing in cities and suburbs alike.  
Integrating community engagement into an effective administrative process 
requires addressing the various ways in which existing public participation 
processes have failed to serve their purported goals.  This Article critically 
examines how public participation operates in land use planning and 
approvals.  It then proposes a new model, drawing lessons from other 
administrative processes, in an effort to balance public input, legal 
standards, and expertise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A community room overflows with neighbors protesting a for-profit, 
out-of-town real estate developer’s efforts to bypass local zoning.  The 
developer seeks to build what the neighbors believe is a noxious use on the 
site of an existing housing development.  State law favors the developer:  a 
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statute limits the grounds on which the municipality can deny zoning 
approval.  The developer trots out experts-for-hire who submit thick reports 
dismissing resident concerns about safety, property values, and traffic. 
The neighbors organize.  Posting on social media and putting flyers in 
mailboxes, they inform the community about the proposed development.  
They rely on their knowledge about the neighborhood to describe the 
detrimental impacts that the development will have on their community.  
They educate themselves about the land use approvals and corporate 
subsidies sought by the developer.  They make Freedom of Information Act 
requests in an effort to expose backroom dealings between local officials and 
the out-of-town developer. 
In response, the local planning and zoning commission slows the process 
and keeps the public hearing open for almost five months.  Neighbors become 
lay public relations experts.  Thanks to their mobilization, local newspapers 
decry the project.  The neighbors push creative legal arguments to support 
killing the development proposal.  Ultimately, the planning and zoning 
commission, citing public testimony against the project, applies the 
neighbors’ novel legal strategies to deny the application for zoning relief.  
The town agrees to defend the strategy when the developer appeals the denial 
in court. 
The neighbors’ arguments echo those made by both academic and 
practicing proponents of the community development movement.1  The 
people most affected by a proposed redevelopment project are those who live 
adjacent to it.2  Public participation mechanisms should both ensure that 
residents have the opportunity to express local needs and require that the 
redevelopment meet those needs.3  If the neighbors oppose the project, it 
should not occur.4  Where existing law favors real estate developers 
disfavored by the community, local government should not hesitate to 
embrace novel legal arguments to empower the community.5 
So, as a community lawyer teaching a community development clinic, did 
I celebrate the perseverance, ingenuity, and political savvy of the 
community?  Was I comforted to see that moneyed development interests 
and their lying, opportunistic, rapacious lawyers could be overcome by 
political mobilization? 
Well, no.  I was one of those lawyers.6  My client, a small, volunteer-run 
housing authority, sought, in partnership with a for-profit affordable housing 
developer, to redevelop a fifty-unit affordable housing complex for elderly 
 
 1. William H. Simon defines community economic development as “(1) efforts to 
develop housing, jobs, or business opportunities for low-income people (2) in which a leading 
role is played by nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations (3) that are accountable to 
residentially defined communities.” WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT:  LAW, BUSINESS, & THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 3 (2001). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.2. 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. (Though I prefer to describe myself as truthful, strategic, and pro bono.) 
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individuals.  The complex, built prior to the adoption of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 19907 (ADA), had reached the end of its useful life, and 
its dated design did not serve its residents’ needs.  Once rehabilitated, the 
new ADA-compliant development would house sixty-seven low-income 
families in a state-of-the-art building in a well-off, disproportionately white, 
waterfront suburb just a few miles from a small, racially diverse city.  Far 
from comforted, I was appalled to hear neighbors use the rhetoric of 
community to kill affordable housing in an exclusionary suburb.8 
In fact, local control, community empowerment, and public participation 
are among the building blocks of residential segregation.  It has long been 
the case that there is nothing inherently inclusionary about American notions 
of “community” or “public participation.”  For generations, white 
neighborhoods have shielded themselves in the rhetoric of community 
control.9  In just one example, during the civil rights era, the Chicago Tribune 
excused violent white rioters responding to a nonviolent civil rights protest 
by faulting the desegregation advocates for marching in a white 
neighborhood:  “The demonstrators knew they were asking for trouble when 
they invaded the Gage Park community.”10 
There are, tragically, countless such examples.  How, then, can earnest 
cries for public participation to empower poor and marginalized people be 
squared with the use of the same tool to exclude poor people and people of 
color from tony, well-resourced neighborhoods?  The community 
development and land use literatures are rife with the assumption that, when 
it comes to community control and public participation in development and 
 
 7. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
and 47 U.S.C.). 
 8. Notably, they also weaponized the language of environmentalism, preservation of 
Native American history, and public safety, using progressive rhetoric to advance a regressive 
result. 
 9. See, e.g., JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN:  LOCAL POLITICS AND 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES 206–07 (2018).  To this day, “[o]pposition to housing 
development is more likely in areas with highly educated and non-Hispanic White residents, 
with no relationship to national political preferences.” JONATHAN ROTHWELL, TERNER CTR. 
FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, LAND USE POLITICS, HOUSING COSTS AND SEGREGATION IN 
CALIFORNIA CITIES 11 (2019), http://californialanduse.org/download/ 
Land%20Use%20Politics%20Rothwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQU8-7XGB].  That 
opposition often manifests as cries for protecting or enhancing local control of zoning. See, 
e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning:  Land Use Preemption amid a Housing Crisis, 60 
B.C. L. REV. 823, 836–37 (2019); Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Senate Passes Controversial 
Zoning Reform Bill, CONN. MIRROR (May 28, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/2021/05/28/senate-
passes-controversial-zoning-reform-bill/ [https://perma.cc/UX3T-TB8K]; Lisa Prevost, A 
Push for Zoning Reform in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/realestate/connecticut-zoning-reform.html 
[https://perma.cc/C5R5-DD6R]; Edward Ring, State Legislature Continues Its Assault on 
Local Zoning Decisions, CAL. POL’Y CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://californiapolicycenter.org/ 
state-legislature-continues-its-assault-on-local-zoning-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/7YPZ-
S7P2]; Geoff Beckwith, Legislature Should Protect Local Decision-Making over Zoning, 
Land Use, MASS. MUN. ASS’N (Nov. 2017), https://www.mma.org/advocacy/legislature-
should-protect-local-decision-making-over-zoning-land-use/ [https://perma.cc/J5LK-962C]. 
 10. BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES:  HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND REAL 
ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA 200 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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redevelopment projects, poor and marginalized people benefit from more 
community engagement and public participation.11  Often, however, when it 
comes to land use decision-making, public participation is utterly 
dysfunctional—and poor people bear the brunt of that dysfunction. 
There are two possible responses to broken public participation processes:  
policy makers can eliminate the opportunity for public input or they can 
better design participation processes.  This Article proposes both reducing 
opportunities for public participation and improving the processes that 
remain.  It sets out how to improve the public participation process that 
accompanies planning and zoning—the rules  applicable to all users of 
property.  It then argues that there ought to be extremely limited participation 
opportunities when zoning officials apply those rules to individual 
development proposals.  In short, this Article calls for planning and zoning 
to draw on lessons from other administrative processes, which distinguish 
rulemaking from adjudication. 
These proposed reforms are responsive to the failures of today’s land use 
and zoning processes.  This Article will begin by surfacing and analyzing 
assumptions about public participation.  It will then propose models for more 
effective forms of public participation.  Part I describes the ways in which 
land use and related laws enshrine public participation in the real estate 
development process.  Part II describes common arguments in favor of 
enhanced public participation and the history that grounds many of those 
arguments.  Part III critiques the ways in which public participation takes 
place, both in practice and as idealized in the literature.  Part IV proposes a 
redesign of public participation and community engagement in the land use 
sphere. 
I.  LAND USE AND ZONING’S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS 
 
The law bakes community control and public participation into the land 
use process.  No other local government function, whether budgeting, 
policing, or education, features or prioritizes public participation to the 
degree seen in land use law.12  The contours of those requirements have 
 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. American cities require an enormous number of new housing units each year to apply 
for discretionary approvals, the process for which includes public participation. See infra Part 
I.B.  In San Francisco, for example, every unit is subject to a discretionary approval. See Moira 
O’Neill et al., Developing Policy from the Ground Up:  Examining Entitlement in the Bay 
Area to Inform California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 1, 49 (2019).  
O’Neill and her co-authors did a deep dive into five California jurisdictions’ review of 
development proposals and found that “[a]ll five jurisdictions we examined require 
discretionary review for residential developments of five or more units.  These discretionary 
review processes apply even if these developments comply with the underlying zoning code.” 
Id.  Outside California, discretionary review is similarly widespread. Robert C. Ellickson, 
Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and 
Greater Austin, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1622, 1632 (2021) (“[Z]oning ordinances 
increasingly make land-use decisions discretionary.  A locality may expressly retain, for 
example, the power to approve or reject a final site plan, subdivision map, or permit for a 
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shifted, however, in the one hundred years since state and local governments 
began adopting zoning regulations. 
A.  The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
In 1924, the U.S. Department of Commerce published the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act13 (the “Standard Act”) with the hope, quickly realized, 
that states would adopt and “[m]odify this standard act as little as possible.”14  
By the terms of the Standard Act, states delegate their police power to local 
governments to adopt zoning codes, provided those codes meet the 
limitations set forth in the Standard Act.15  With respect to the process by 
which each local government adopts a zoning code, the Standard Act—for 
the most part—deferred to local governments:  “The [local] legislative 
body . . . shall provide for the manner in which such regulations and 
restrictions and the boundaries of such districts shall be determined, 
established, and enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or 
changed.”16 
The Standard Act does, however, require one element of the process:  a 
public hearing, to be held at least fifteen days prior to initial adoption of or 
later amendment to a local zoning code.17  The Standard Act is explicit that 
the public hearing should be open to all “citizens.”18  The Standard Act 
explains that the hearing must be open to those who do not own property in 
the relevant zoning district: 
This permits any person to be heard, and not merely property owners whose 
property interests may be adversely affected by the proposed ordinance.  It 
is right that every citizen should be able to make his voice heard and protest 
against any ordinance that might be detrimental to the best interests of the 
city.19 
 
multifamily project.” (footnote omitted)).  In fact, when by-right development is permitted, 
observers will express surprise that no participatory process is available to them. Daniela A. 
Tagtachian et al., Building by Right:  Social Equity Implications of Transitioning to 
Form-Based Code, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 71, 88 (2019); Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 122 n.137 
(2015).  In the local budgeting context, by contrast, even a city like New York—which has a 
touted, established participatory budgeting scheme—only subjects 0.4 percent of its annual 
budget to participatory processes. See Colin O’Connor, Participatory Budgeting Grows in 
NYC—Why Isn’t Every Council Member Doing It?, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/government/5946-participatory-budgeting-grows-in-nyc-
why-isnt-every-council-member-doing-it [https://perma.cc/LA2C-TN5W]. 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE ZONING 
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (rev. ed. 
1926) [hereinafter STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT].  The Department of Commerce 
formed an advisory committee in 1921 and published the first Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act in 1924. Id. cmt. at iii, 3.  In 1926, it published a revised version. Id. cmt. at i. 
 14. Id. cmt. at 1. 
 15. Id. § 1. 
 16. Id. § 4 (footnote omitted). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. § 4 n.28. 
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While the Standard Act grants participation rights to all, it prioritizes 
participation by nearby property owners.  If immediately adjacent property 
owners or the owners of 20 percent of nearby lots object to a proposed 
rezoning, a 75-percent supermajority of the zoning commission must approve 
a rezoning.20 
Notably, the Standard Act distinguishes between decisions to adopt or 
modify generally applicable zoning provisions21 and site-specific 
decisions.22  The Standard Act endows zoning commissions with the first 
category, the power to recommend legislative action to enact and amend 
zoning ordinances.23  It charges boards of adjustment with the second 
category, the power to make exceptions upon request of a party seeking relief 
from the ordinance.24 
The second category, site-specific relief, typically takes one of two forms.  
First, a property owner might seek permission (termed a special permit, 
special exception, or conditional use permit) to conduct a use conditionally 
permitted by the zoning ordinance.25  Second, property owners might seek 
relief from a zoning ordinance that imposes unduly onerous burdens on the 
development or use of their parcels.26  These are commonly termed 
variances.27  In the case of adjustment decisions, the Standard Act requires 
that the aggrieved party be permitted to present evidence.28  It further requires 
that all meetings be public and that any interested member of the public be 
permitted to attend and observe.29  It does not permit members of the public 
to testify or otherwise provide evidence in support of or in opposition to an 
adjustment application.30 
The Standard Act’s distinction between zoning decisions and adjustment 
decisions comports with administrative law’s distinction between legislative 
and adjudicative proceedings.  Zoning adoption and changes implicate 
broader interests.  Adjudicative proceedings, applying a generally applicable 
standard to a single parcel, present narrower issues. 
 
 20. Id. § 5. 
 21. Id. § 6.  This Article refers to such decisions as “zoning decisions.” 
 22. Id. § 7.  This Article refers to such decisions as “development approvals” or 
“adjustment decisions.” 
 23. Id. § 6. 
 24. Id. § 7.  In contemporary practice, these boards are more frequently called boards of 
zoning appeals (or zoning boards of appeals). 
 25. Id. § 7(2). 
 26. Id. § 7(3). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 7. 
 29. Id.  The rights to attend and observe adjudications, as well as access records and 
filings, are, of course, core rights in and of themselves. See generally Judith Resnik, The 
Functions of Publicity and of Privatization in Courts and Their Replacements (from Jeremy 
Bentham to #MeToo and Google Spain), in OPEN JUSTICE:  THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 177 (Burkhard Hess & Ana Koprivica Harvey eds., 2019). 
 30. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 7 (specifying only that 
“[a]ll meetings of the board shall be open to the public”). 
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B.  Contemporary Public Participation Requirements 
Zoning enabling acts have evolved since the 1920s, but they continue to 
require public hearings prior to zoning decisions.  Today’s zoning enabling 
acts, like the original zoning enabling acts modeled after the Standard Act, 
“generally require that city councils grant notice and an opportunity to be 
heard to landowners whose land will be zoned”31 and make such opportunity 
to be heard available to anyone who attends the public hearing.32  Often, there 
 
 31. Nicolas M. Kublicki, Land Use by, for, and of the People:  Problems with the 
Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 99, 109 
(1991); see also 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8:13 (rev. 5th ed. supp. 
2021) (surveying notice requirements for public hearings prescribed in various state zoning 
enabling acts).  Many zoning enabling act provisions require notification to nearby local 
property owners adjacent to or within a certain radius of proposed zoning code adoptions or 
amendments. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65091(a)(4), 65854 (West 2021); IDAHO CODE 
§ 67-6511(2)(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subd. 3 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:55D-62.1 (West 2021); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24-51, 53(d)(2) (2021); TEX. LOC. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 211.006(b), 211.007(c) (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(B) 
(2021); cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2021) (notice of certain zoning changes required 
for nonresident property owners who have specifically requested such notice).  Others require 
that nearby owners be notified about applications to zoning bodies regarding specific projects, 
such as applications for special use permits, conditional uses, special exceptions, or variances. 
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65091(a)(4), 65905 (West 2021) (notice required for variances, 
conditional uses, and appeals); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6512(b), 6516 (2021) (special use permits 
and variances); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-12 (West 2021) (all “applications for development,” 
including major site plans and variances); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 44-108(C) (2021) (all 
variances or exceptions other than “minor” ones); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24-41, 42, 66 
(2021) (variances, special-use permits, and appeals).  Even in states where notice to abutters 
is not statutorily mandated, localities are usually free to establish these requirements via 
ordinance. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-3, 8-3c, 8-7, 8-26 (2021) (allowing, but not 
requiring, localities to provide for additional notice in all matters requiring public hearings, 
including zone changes, special permits, variances, appeals, and subdivision proposals); 
DARIEN, CONN., ZONING REGULS. §§ 1041–1043, 1114 (2021) (imposing additional notice 
requirements to abutters for zoning amendments and applications to zoning commission); 
NEW ROCHELLE, N.Y., CODE §§ 331-121, 331-134, 331-146 (2021) (requiring notice to 
abutters for zoning changes and applications for special permits, variances, site plans and 
subdivision approval); SCARSDALE, N.Y., CODE § A319-13 (2019) (requiring notification for 
appeals to zoning board); SYRACUSE, N.Y., ZONING RULES & REGULS. § 2, art. 5(3)(d)(3) 
(2019) (same); see also N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a cmt. (McKinney 2021) (noting that while 
New York’s statutes do not require notice beyond publication for hearings on applications to 
zoning boards of appeals, “most local zoning laws provide for additional notification in the 
form of a mailing to property owners within a designated distance of property which is the 
subject of an application and/or posting conspicuous notices of the hearing on the property”).  
But see N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Twp. Council of Twp. of Edison, 889 A.2d 1129, 1132 
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2006) (interpreting use of mandatory “shall” language to conclude 
that notification requirements in New Jersey’s state enabling act set a ceiling that localities 
could not exceed with more stringent requirements). 
 32. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65351 (West 2021) (“During the preparation or 
amendment of the general plan, the planning agency shall provide opportunities for the 
involvement of citizens, California Native American Indian tribes, public agencies, public 
utility companies, and civic, education, and other community groups, through public hearings 
and any other means the planning agency deems appropriate.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-7d(a) 
(2021) (providing that “any person or persons may appear and be heard and may be 
represented by agent or by attorney” at hearings concerning zoning amendments and formal 
petitions, applications, requests or appeals); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2021) (“No 
zoning ordinance or by-law or amendment thereto shall be adopted until after the planning 
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are two required public hearings:  one before an administrative agency and a 
second before a legislative body.33  Furthermore, 
[t]he courts have found that, even if a state statute does not provide for 
notice and a hearing prior to the enactment of a zoning regulation, a 
regulation adopted without notice and a hearing may be held 
unconstitutional as contrary to the notice and hearing requirements required 
by procedural due process.34 
In the case of adjustment decisions, however, enabling acts are not so 
uniform.  The Standard Act did not anticipate public participation in 
connection with adjustment decisions.35  In the post-urban renewal era, some 
states added public participation requirements to the adjustment process.36  
Today, in about one-half of states, zoning enabling statutes do not distinguish 
between zoning and adjustment decisions with respect to public participation 
requirements.37  In these states, which include high-housing-cost states like 
California, Massachusetts, and New York, contemporary statutes require 
public hearings open to all participants in both types of proceedings.38  In 
addition, some local governments impose additional public participation 
requirements on top of those mandated by state law.  In Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, for example, when considering an application for conditional 
approval, the Planning Board is required to do the following: 
[C]onsider what reasonable efforts have been made [by the would-be 
developer] to address concerns raised by abutters and neighbors to the 
project site.  An applicant seeking a special permit . . . shall solicit input 
from affected neighbors before submitting a special permit application.  
The application shall include a report on all outreach conducted and 
 
board in a city or town, and the city council or a committee designated or appointed for the 
purpose by said council has each held a public hearing thereon, together or separately, at which 
interested persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 44-
109(4) (2021) (providing that “any party may appear in person or by agent or by attorney” at 
hearings held in connection with appeals to boards of adjustment); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-
24-66 (2021) (same); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 211.006(a) (West 2021) (“A regulation 
or boundary [pertaining to zoning amendments] is not effective until after a public hearing on 
the matter at which parties in interest and citizens have an opportunity to be heard.”). 
 33. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65854, 65856 (West 2021). 
 34. Douglas A. Jorden & Michele A. Hentrich, Public Participation Is on the Rise:  A 
Review of the Changes in the Notice and Hearing Requirements for the Adoption and 
Amendment of General Plans and Rezonings Nationwide and in Recent Arizona Land Use 
Legislation, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 870–71 (2003). 
 35. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 7; see also supra notes 
30 and accompanying text. 
 36. “Since 1973, many states have adopted statutory provisions requiring municipalities 
to implement procedures that increase public awareness and participation in the planning and 
zoning processes.” Jorden & Hentrich, supra note 34, at 876. 
 37. Anika Singh Lemar, 50 State Survey of Zoning Enabling Acts (2021) (unpublished 
dataset on file with author).  Case law can also play a part here by requiring, as a matter of 
due process, that nearby property owners receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
connection with a development approval application. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 
492 P.2d 1137, 1141–42 (Cal. 1972). 
 38. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65905 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 40A § 15 
(2021); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 27-B (McKinney 2021); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-B (McKinney 
2021); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-B (McKinney 2021). 
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meetings held, shall describe the issues raised by community members, and 
shall describe how the proposal responds to those issues.39 
Therefore, the ordinance assigns to the developer the responsibility to 
conduct community outreach and respond to community concerns, even 
before applying for land use approvals. 
Requiring public hearings in connection with project-specific approvals 
collapses the Standard Act’s distinction between zoning and adjustment 
decisions.  The distinction between zoning and adjustment decisions is 
further diminished because zoning ordinances today are more restrictive than 
they were prior to the late 1960s.40  Under such ordinances, if the existing 
zoning does not permit anything, or anything realistic, to be built as-of-right, 
then every developer must seek a development-specific approval.  Indeed, 
across the country, the urban “zoning pattern . . . is one of universal low 
density, where any development with higher densities is treated as a 
variance.”41  Much of what exists in urban centers is out of compliance with 
local zoning codes; either it predates the adoption of zoning or it was 
constructed only after seeking land use approvals that required extensive 
public participation processes.42 
Responding to restrictive zoning ordinances,43 developers seeking to build 
multifamily housing and mixed-use developments must seek zone changes 
for site-specific applications.  The market demands these types of 
developments, but too often zoning, even in urban areas and nearby suburbs, 
fails to anticipate them.  As a result, developers seek site-specific, 
 
 39. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ZONING ORDINANCE § 5.28.28.1(d) (2019). 
 40. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 325 
(5th ed. 2021) (explaining that jurisdictions with zoning power “increasingly use . . . ‘wait and 
see’ zoning, in which undeveloped land is placed in a [development-restrictive] holding 
category, such as agricultural use, until someone expresses an interest in developing the land 
for a more intense use”).  Theories explaining why exclusionary zoning became rampant 
starting in the 1960s and 1970s emphasize many different causes, ranging from inflation, see 
William A. Fischel, The Rise of the Homevoters:  How the Growth Machine Was Subverted 
by OPEC and Earth Day, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 13, 13–
37 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017), to misguided, sprawl-inducing 
environmentalism, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!:  THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE 
REGULATION 205–07 (2015), to racism, see SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION:  
HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 107–10 (2004); David S. 
Schoenbrod, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1420–21 (1969).  Likely, all three 
phenomena played a significant role. 
 41. EVE BACH ET AL., CMTY. OWNERSHIP ORG. PROJECT, THE CITIES’ WEALTH:  PROGRAMS 
FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC CONTROL IN BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 29 (1976), 
https://ecommons-new.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/40494/ 
CitiesWealth.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/TCP7-AFYU]. 
 42. See, e.g., Quoctrung Bui et al., 40 Percent of the Buildings in Manhattan Could Not 
Be Built Today, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/ 
19/upshot/forty-percent-of-manhattans-buildings-could-not-be-built-today.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WNN-KSP6]; Markeshia Ricks, Report:  Re-Zone Westville Village, NEW 
HAVEN INDEP. (Mar. 16, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/ 
archives/entry/westville_zoning/ [https://perma.cc/GK7M-2UM8]. 
 43. Over the last five decades, highly restrictive zoning ordinances have become common 
not only in the suburbs first designed to exclude affordable housing but also in cities. See infra 
note 103 and accompanying text. 
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parcel-specific zone changes, rendering the zone change not a generally 
applicable regulation but instead a development-specific modification.  
These are effectively adjustment decisions cloaked as zoning decisions. 
Additional public participation requirements are sometimes layered onto 
zoning and land use requirements.  Some states, most notably New York and 
California, impose state-level environmental review requirements on 
adoption of an amendment to zoning ordinances.44  These “little NEPAs”45 
include their own public notice and comment opportunities in connection 
with land use and transportation planning decisions.  These notice and 
comment opportunities sit on top of the public hearing requirements in 
zoning enabling statutes and zoning ordinances. 
Many states facilitate redevelopment by enabling acquisition and 
disposition of blighted sites.46  These urban redevelopment statutes also 
include public participation requirements.47 
There are many more opportunities for public participation in the 
development process today than there were when states first began adopting 
zoning enabling acts.  Part II describes some of the arguments in favor of that 
enhanced public participation.  This backdrop informs Part III’s critique of 
contemporary public participation processes and Part IV’s calls for reform. 
II.  WHY PUBLIC PARTICIPATION? 
In Part III, I critique the ways in which public participation takes place and 
the effects it has on the development process, both in practice and as idealized 
in the literature.  Before I do so, in this part, I describe arguments in favor of 
enhancing public participation requirements and the urban development 
history that often undergirds those arguments. 
Arguments in favor of adding public participation requirements to 
development processes typically center accountability to existing residents48:  
the idea that new real estate development should meet the needs and desires 
of people who already live in the neighborhood or town where the proposed 
 
 44. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189.70.10 (West 2021); N.Y. ENV’T 
CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101–8-0117 (McKinney 2021). 
 45. NEPA references the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4347, under which the Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated regulations that 
require the issuance of an environmental impact statement (EIS) and an opportunity for public 
participation in the development of the EIS whenever the federal government undertakes 
major actions that may impact environmental concerns. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1502 
(2021).  While NEPA does not apply to local and state zoning decisions, some little NEPAs, 
modeled on the federal act, do.  Most little NEPAs, however, apply to governmental siting or 
funding decisions but exempt zoning decisions from their purview. See 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF 
& DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S:  THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 21.50 (rev. 4th 
ed. Supp. 2019). 
 46. See John R. Nolon & Jessica Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 37 REAL EST. 
L.J. 234, 237 (2008). 
 47. See id. at 237, 242–43. 
 48. See Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City:  Toward 
Development Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 26 
(2013). 
1094 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
development is located.  In most localities, developers need only seek land 
use approvals if their proposed development does not meet the strictures of 
the local zoning ordinance.49  Advocates for more public participation 
demand, instead, that all proposed developments be subjected to public 
hearings.50  They seek accountability through a public process that prioritizes 
public participation. 
A.  Unaccountable Government:  The Scars of Urban Renewal 
In the wake of disastrous, federally funded, locally implemented 
experiments in urban renewal, early community development proponents 
fought for, and won, additional avenues for public participation in the 
redevelopment process.51  Mid-twentieth century urban renewal projects 
razed existing neighborhoods in favor of highways or new developments—
sometimes commercial, but often public housing.  According to many critics, 
redevelopment was a top-down process that ignored local preferences and 
disregarded social capital embedded in existing communities.  
Redevelopment agencies ignored the value existing residents ascribed to 
their neighborhoods. 
While there are many valid criticisms of urban renewal, one frequent 
argument is that these projects ignored community perspectives.  Local 
 
 49. But see O’Neill et al., supra note 12, at 49 (stating that San Francisco, unlike other 
cities included in the survey, subjects all development to discretionary approvals).  Of course, 
if the zoning ordinance is highly restrictive, developers may, in practice, have to seek 
approvals for all proposed projects.  Zoning ordinances that limit development to single-family 
housing on large lots are considered exclusionary for this reason.  Aesthetic zoning ordinances, 
which overlay subjective approvals based on the appearance of a proposed building, also, in 
effect, require every proposed project to seek and obtain discretionary approvals. Anika Singh 
Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy:  Neighborhood Conservation Districts and the Regulation of 
Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525, 1535 (2015). 
 50. See, e.g., Tom Angotti, “As-of-Right” Development:  An Invitation to Ethical 
Breaches?, GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 19, 2003), https://www.gothamgazette.com/ 
development/1866-qas-of-rightq-development-an-invitation-to-ethical-breaches 
[https://perma.cc/7C2K-YPVR]; Al Norman, What’s Wrong with ‘As-of-Right’ Zoning, 
GREENFIELD RECORDER (June 24, 2020), https://www.recorder.com/my-turn-norman-city-
council-34778458 [https://perma.cc/3S4Z-7H9L].  San Francisco is the best-known example 
of a major American city with no as-of-right development.  Every proposed project is subject 
to a local approvals process. See O’Neill et al., supra note 12, at 49. 
 51. See David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement:  A 
Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 708 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON, 
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT:  LAW, BUSINESS, & THE NEW SOCIAL 
POLICY (2001)) (“A third important criticism of Urban Renewal focuses on deficiencies in the 
processes used to make these consequential redevelopment decisions.  There is a strong sense 
that residents of blighted communities were not given a meaningful role in decisions about the 
redevelopment projects that affected them most acutely.  Growth coalitions—forged by 
governing regimes of mayors in league with state officials, business elites, and a cheerleading 
local press—favored, and managed to secure, decisional processes designed to give actual 
community residents little voice.”); Bezdek, supra note 48, at 28–29; Audrey G. McFarlane, 
When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion:  The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in 
Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 871 (2000); Damon Y. Smith, Participatory 
Planning and Procedural Protections:  The Case for Deeper Public Participation in Urban 
Redevelopment, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 243, 248 (2009). 
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government officials, armed with federal dollars, razed neighborhoods 
populated largely by low- and moderate-income people to make way for 
highways and private development.52  The highways bifurcated 
neighborhoods and facilitated white flight.53  Meanwhile, the 
much-anticipated private development often never came.  The textbook 
example is New Haven, Connecticut’s Oak Street neighborhood, an 
immigrant enclave razed to make way for a highway, called “the Connector,” 
that would have connected I-95 to I-84, had it ever been built.54  With federal 
funds, the local redevelopment authority cleared nearly nine hundred homes 
and over three hundred small businesses for the planned highway 
connector.55  Authorities displaced thousands of people.56  Other than a small 
artery leading into downtown and a parking garage serving Yale New Haven 
Hospital, the land remained vacant through the Great Recession.57  
Elsewhere in the city, when private development did come, it did not last.  
The downtown mall built on urban renewal land in the 1950s failed to 
resuscitate New Haven as the region’s shopping center.58  The mall lost its 
anchor tenant in the 1980s and collapsed entirely in the early 2000s.59  
Analogous examples exist in cities across the country.60 
 
 52. Andrew Small, The Wastelands of Urban Renewal, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB  
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-13/how-the-bulldozer-
became-an-urban-block-buster [https://perma.cc/PDJ2-699X]. 
 53. See Robert A. Solomon, Building a Segregated City:  How We All Worked Together, 
16 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 265, 281–90 (1997). 
 54. See LIZABETH COHEN, SAVING AMERICA’S CITIES:  ED LOGUE AND THE STRUGGLE TO 
RENEW URBAN AMERICA IN THE SUBURBAN AGE 127 (2019); see also DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY:  
URBANISM AND ITS END 333–37 (2003).  The failure of urban renewal was not that New Haven 
never built the Connector.  New Haven and cities across the country consummated most of 
the highway projects that they attempted.  Urban renewal’s failure was that its policy agenda 
turned out to be wrong.  The car-centric approach to urban revitalization was simply, as an 
objective matter, an ineffective, counterproductive way to try to improve cities. See, e.g., 
Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 775 (2007) 
(finding that highway development has significantly contributed to central city population 
decline). 
 55. History, DOWNTOWN CROSSING NEW HAVEN, 
https://downtowncrossingnewhaven.com/history/ [https://perma.cc/WNW5-VZ4C] (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 56. See RAE, supra note 54, at 340–41. 
 57. See id. at 333–34.  Over the last decade, the abandoned highway route has begun to 
be redeveloped as high-end office space, laboratory space, and a chain drug store among other 
uses. See New Haven’s Downtown Crossing Project, DOWNTOWN CROSSING NEW HAVEN, 
https://www.downtowncrossingnewhaven.com [https://perma.cc/D7BF-ARMH] (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2021) (providing updates on the status of the redevelopment). 
 58. COHEN, supra note 54, at 108. 
 59. Id.  Consistent with the story I tell in Part II, a private-sector developer redeveloped 
the mall as market-rate housing and Class A office space in 2003. Tara York, Chapel Square 
Mall Gets Turned . . . Inside Out, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Jan. 18, 2004), 
https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Chapel-Square-Mall-gets-turned-INSIDE-OUT-
11662256.php [https://perma.cc/9EGD-L7GD]. 
 60. See Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, COMMENT. (April 1965), 
https://www.commentary.org/articles/herbert-gans/the-failure-of-urban-renewal/ 
[https://perma.cc/AM3E-JDWM] (providing contemporaneous examples of urban renewal’s 
failures in many American cities). 
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Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, massive federal subsidies for 
urban development slowed and the threat of unaccountable governmental 
development abated.  Rather than spend large amounts directly, the federal 
government funneled smaller amounts through state and local government.  
The United States Housing Act of 193761 and its 1949,62 1954,63 and 195964 
successors directed federal subsidies to local governments, and later to 
nonprofit entities, to construct housing.65  The later statutes also dedicated 
significant funds for the clearance of blight.66  The housing legislation of the 
1960s67 provided below-market interest rates to certain housing developers 
and rental assistance to tenants.68  The Housing and Urban Development Act 
of 196869 directed affordable housing production subsidies to both nonprofit 
and for-profit housing developers.70 
In the Nixon years, the federal government placed a moratorium on 
housing subsidies.71  The moratorium ended with the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974,72 which “eliminated most categorical 
urban development programs, including Urban Renewal, and replaced them 
with a community development block grant” program that enabled localities 
to choose how to allocate the funds.73  While the program still exists, the total 
amount of funding, adjusted for inflation, is now a fraction of what it was in 
1974 and is spread out over many more jurisdictions.74 
 
 61. Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437). 
 62. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 63. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections the U.S.C.). 
 64. Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 654 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12, 40, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 65. John R. Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal 
Austerity:  The Trend Toward Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW. 249, 
253–54 (1982). 
 66. GRACE MILGRAM ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., A CHRONOLOGY OF HOUSING 
LEGISLATION AND SELECTED EXECUTIVE ACTIONS, 1892–1992, at 32, 52–53, 57–58, 79, 85 
(1993). 
 67. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 68. Nolon, supra note 65, at 254–55. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 70. Nolon, supra note 65, at 255. 
 71. See Agis Salpukas, Moratorium on Housing Subsidy Spells Hardship for Thousands, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/16/archives/moratorium-
onhousing-subsidy-spells-hardship-for-thousands-stricter.html [https://perma.cc/4DAR-
YMKQ]. 
 72. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 73. Nolon, supra note 65, at 255. 
 74. See BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., TAKING STOCK OF THE COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT 3–4, figs.1–2 (2017). 
2021] OVERPARTICIPATION 1097 
As federal funding dwindled, low-income neighborhoods struggled, not 
with unaccountable development, but with disinvestment,75 both private and 
public.  Disinvestment did create space, however, for more bottom-up real 
estate development.  “The Community Economic Development (CED) 
movement arose out of the resulting struggle of urban residents, particularly 
those in distressed inner cities, to access public and private capital to build 
and operate essential community facilities and services.”76  The movement 
supported (and continues to support) small-scale development undertaken by 
community development corporations, which are locally controlled nonprofit 
organizations.  Community development corporations rely on what limited 
pots of federal and local subsidy remain in the post-urban renewal era, as 
well as grant funding,77 to build affordable housing, child care centers, and 
small-scale retail shops in low-income communities.78  For decades, the 
community development movement furthered accountable development by 
undertaking projects directed by community residents acting through locally 
controlled nonprofit, mission-motivated organizations.79 
B.  Unaccountable Markets:  The Threat of Gentrification 
For a time, neither government nor the private sector expressed much 
interest in developing land in urban centers.  As a result, unaccountable 
development did not pose a threat to urban residents.80  Eventually, however, 
urban areas saw a renewed interest from the middle class and the wealthy.  In 
the wake of this shift in desirable living patterns, community development 
practitioners enlarged their focus to include not only government-sponsored 
and funded development but also private development. 
At first, low-income communities saw redevelopment take the form of 
public-private partnerships involving government subsidies, whether in the 
form of tax credits, cash, or land.81  Because the decision to grant a subsidy 
is often a political one, the subsidy process required some amount of public 
 
 75. The term “disinvestment” is a misnomer in some ways.  In many neighborhoods, 
Black homeowners and renters invested significant amounts of time and money in their 
neighborhoods, only to see those resources siphoned off by predatory absentee lenders and 
landlords. See generally SATTER, supra note 10. 
 76. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering:  Navigating the Political 
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999, 2001–02 (2007). 
 77. See Build Healthy Places Staff, CDC (Community Development Corporation), BUILD 
HEALTHY PLACES NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.buildhealthyplaces.org/sharing-
knowledge/jargon/cdc-community-development-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/J2D9-SUFL]. 
 78. SIMON, supra note 1, at 4 (describing small, locally controlled nonprofit organizations 
developing affordable housing, child care centers, and a grocery store in low-income 
neighborhoods in Boston). 
 79. See id. 
 80. As Professor John Mangin puts it, “[i]n the 1960s, ‘70s, and beyond, many cities were 
desperate for any development they could get.” John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 92 (2014). 
 81. See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV., 
May–June 1995, at 55, 62, 67 (describing the centrality of subsidies in urban economic 
revitalization efforts). 
1098 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
input.82  As market-rate housing and commercial projects in low-income 
neighborhoods proved their profitability, however, government subsidies 
were no longer defining features of redevelopment projects.83  The public 
hearing requirements embedded in land use approvals processes ensured that 
public participation continued to play a significant role in the redevelopment 
process.84 
Simultaneously, as described above, grant subsidies for affordable housing 
production became increasingly rare.85  The Reagan-era Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit program (LIHTC)86—which, because it relies on a 
corporate tax credit, requires private market participation87—was ascendant; 
today, it is the largest subsidy for affordable rental housing.88  In states that 
do not dedicate capital funds or tax subsidies to housing production, LIHTC 
is effectively the only available production subsidy for low-income 
housing.89  Small-scale, community-controlled developers must partner with 
large-scale nonlocal developers—both for-profit and nonprofit—in order to 
navigate program requirements and satisfy the investors’ and syndicators’ 
requirements for participating in LIHTC developments.90  And small-scale 
 
 82. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Bruce Katz & Julie Wagner, Transformative Investments:  Remaking American 
Cities for a New Century, BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
articles/transformative-investments-remaking-american-cities-for-a-new-century/ 
[https://perma.cc/BWV4-VHQL].  I use the term “redevelopment projects” to refer to 
development of land that has been previously developed.  There are jurisdictions, notably 
California, where this term has had a more specific technical definition. See CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 33010 (West 2021) (defining “[r]edevelopment project”). 
 84. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS:  HOW OUR CITIES ARE INCREASING 
INEQUALITY, DEEPENING SEGREGATION, AND FAILING THE MIDDLE CLASS—AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT 42–45 (2017); see supra Part I. 
 85. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 86. 26 U.S.C. § 42. 
 87. Similarly, the New Markets Tax Credit and Opportunity Zones programs rely not on 
small, community-based nonprofit organizations but instead on large, institutional investors 
to enact the federal government’s community economic development strategy (to the extent a 
strategy other than corporate tax avoidance exists at all). See generally 26 U.S.C. § 45D; id. 
§ 1440Z-2. 
 88. What Is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and How Does It Work?, TAX POL’Y 
CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-
and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/PGC5-DL9U] (May 2020). 
 89. CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY ET AL., URB. INST., THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT:  HOW IT WORKS AND WHO IT SERVES 15 (2018) (“LIHTC is the only major funding 
source for producing and preserving affordable rental housing.”).  Federal tax subsidies for 
homeownership—disproportionately claimed by wealthy taxpayers—constitute the largest 
federal housing subsidy by far and remain, for the most part, unscathed. See Jenny Schuetz, 
Under US Housing Policies, Homeowners Mostly Win, While Renters Mostly Lose, 
BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/under-us-housing-
policies-homeowners-mostly-win-while-renters-mostly-lose/ [https://perma.cc/XN78-
CALJ]. 
 90. See Teresa M. Santalucia, Beginner’s Guide to Nonprofit and Affordable Housing 
Partnerships (unpublished manuscript at 66–68) (on file with author); see also SCALLY ET AL., 
supra note 89, at 5.  Investors typically require substantial financial guarantees, for example, 
that small-scale developers cannot provide. 
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projects are not feasible using LIHTC because the regulatory burdens impose 
significant transaction costs. 
As private actors played a larger role in urban redevelopment projects, 
development became not only a goal of, but also a threat to, community 
development practice.  Increasing land prices made it difficult for community 
development corporations and other local actors to purchase property.91  
Thus, a fundamental tenet of community economic development practice—
“a leading role is played by nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations”92—
came under attack.  And with outsiders now interested in developing 
previously underinvested areas, the development process risked becoming, 
once again, unaccountable to the community.  All development, not just 
large-scale government-sponsored redevelopment, now posed a risk.  While 
capital is mobile, low-income people typically are not,93 and that lack of 
mobility exacerbated the danger posed by unaccountable development.  Poor 
people cannot easily leave a place that no longer serves their needs for 
another place that does.  As one democracy scholar concisely and eloquently 
put it, “a permeable boundary makes equal civic membership impossible.”94 
Development projects initiated by outsiders reflected and reinforced the 
increased value of land in the central city.95  Rising urban land prices made 
locally controlled development increasingly difficult, and higher land prices 
reflected neighborhoods’ increasing desirability.  The underlying desirability 
reflected in increased land prices made it likely that developers would 
construct high-end retail and market-rate housing—goods and amenities that 
did not directly serve the needs of existing residents.96  Worse, fear of 
gentrification and displacement made such amenities seem like net negatives.  
“Objections to the political and cultural displacement of gentrification by 
long-term residents emphasize the residents’ lack of voice in shaping the 
direction of their neighborhood; that when improvements arrive they are not 
the intended beneficiaries.”97  It is far from clear that private development 
drives displacement, particularly in the majority of American cities other 
than New York, San Francisco, or Washington, D.C.98  Nevertheless, it is 
 
 91. Heather Way et al., Uprooted:  Local Efforts to Mitigate Displacement in Gentrifying 
Neighborhoods, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 39, 47 (2019). 
 92. SIMON, supra note 1, at 3. 
 93. Kelsey Berkowitz, Stuck in Place:  What Lower Geographic Mobility Means for 
Economic Opportunity, THIRD WAY (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.thirdway.org/report/stuck-
in-place-what-lower-geographic-mobility-means-for-economic-opportunity 
[https://perma.cc/FRE9-L8A4] (observing that “college graduates are more mobile than 
people who have a high school diploma or less”). 
 94. Email from Cynthia Farrar to author (Dec. 13, 2020) (on file with author) (quotation 
included in comment on document attached to email correspondence). 
 95. See ALAN MALLACH, THE DIVIDED CITY:  POVERTY AND PROSPERITY IN URBAN 
AMERICA 112–13 (2018). 
 96. See id. at 107–08, 112–13. 
 97. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities?:  Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair 
Housing Act, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 835, 866–67 (2019). 
 98. See generally SHANE PHILLIPS ET AL., UCLA LEWIS CTR. FOR REG’L POL’Y STUD., 
RESEARCH ROUNDUP:  THE EFFECT OF MARKET-RATE DEVELOPMENT ON NEIGHBORHOOD 
RENTS (2021) (collecting empirical studies of market-rate development on local housing 
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quite clear that, for many, fear of gentrifying investment has overtaken fear 
of disinvestment as a driving force behind community development 
practice.99 
The focus on “accountable development” caused community development 
practitioners to become reactive public participants, reliant on the public 
participation process to influence their neighborhoods, rather than proactive 
builders.  As Professor Scott Cummings describes it, while traditional 
community development generally uses background legal rules to structure 
corporate entities and real estate deals that advance economic mobility, when 
community development practitioners respond to private development, “[t]he 
background rules that proved most critical . . . were rights to participate in 
political decision making, particularly those embedded in the land use and 
environmental review process.”100  Maintaining their focus on accountable 
development, community development practitioners and proponents sought 
to ensure that these private development projects served the interests of 
existing communities.  “Governance and participation in decisionmaking 
also provides a buffer to some of the concessions to the inevitability of 
market-oriented urban development in the ‘accountable development’ 
framework.”101 
One of the mechanisms they used to influence private development was, 
and remains, planning and zoning law and process.  Scholars and activists 
have long understood that exclusionary zoning can make housing 
unaffordable in individual suburban towns.102  At least since 1980, restrictive 
zoning has also played a substantial role in the design and building of 
cities.103  Restrictive zoning is just that:  restrictive.  It restricts development 
such that developers who seek to build anything—of any scale—must pursue 
discretionary approvals.  Those discretionary approvals entail processes that 
accommodate extensive public participation.104 
Using these approvals processes, community development practitioners 
turned from using public participation to inform what locally controlled 
organizations built to using public participation to oppose development by 
 
affordability).  See also Laurie Goodman et al., To Understand a City’s Pace of Gentrification, 
Look at Its Housing Supply, URB. INST. (June 24, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-
wire/understand-citys-pace-gentrification-look-its-housing-supply [https://perma.cc/5PXZ-
EH7A] (suggesting that gentrification is slowed, not hastened, by permitting the development 
of new housing supply). 
 99. See MALLACH, supra note 95, at 101 (arguing that some people “see every empty 
house as a stalking horse for gentrification,” even in cities where gentrification is unlikely “in 
the foreseeable future”); Miriam Axel-Lute, Talking About Revitalization When All Anyone 
Wants to Talk About Is Gentrification, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://shelterforce.org/ 
2019/10/24/talking-about-revitalization-when-all-anyone-wants-to-talk-about-is-
gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/K785-889G]. 
 100. Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering:  Community Economic Development in 
the Figueroa Corridor, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 59, 70 (2008). 
 101. Johnson, supra note 97, at 867. 
 102. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands:  Exclusionary Zoning, Equal 
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Schoenbrod, supra note 40. 
 103. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1692 (2013). 
 104. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
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outsiders.  As described by Professors Sheila Foster and Brian Glick, 
community development “attorneys use the procedural tools embedded in 
land use laws, namely, the opportunity for public testimony and comment on 
proposed development projects, both to organize residents and to form 
coalitions of interests around the common goal of contesting the development 
and influencing public officials’ ultimate decisions.”105  They do not rely 
solely on making decision-makers aware of substantive issues; instead, they 
lean on the power of delay inherent in the process:  “attorneys also often use 
such tactics to delay the regulatory process in the hope that the developer will 
eventually back out or make concessions.”106  In Professor Foster and Glick’s 
telling, in contemporary community development practice, the opportunity 
to participate in regulatory decision-making is the primary lever used to 
ensure that new development meets the needs of existing communities.107 
While Foster and Glick write from their experience representing 
community groups in New York, Cummings echoes their work in his 
description of land use battles in Los Angeles:  “The structure of the 
entitlements process permits well-organized opposition groups with strong 
political connections to delay or even prevent key approvals.”108  Cummings 
recounts the importance of labor groups to building a coalition strong enough 
to “make a credible threat of disrupting the entitlements process [made 
possible by the participation process] . . . which would have increased costs 
and uncertainty for the developer.”109  As a result, the coalition successfully 
negotiated a community benefits agreement with the developer.110 
More recently, Daniela A. Tagtachian, Natalie N. Barefoot, and Adrienne 
L. Harreveld write from their experience partnering with communities in 
Miami-Dade County to decry zoning rules that permit administrative 
agencies to approve development applications without first soliciting public 
input.111  The authors describe Miami’s recent adoption of a form-based 
code, a type of zoning ordinance intended to instantiate pedestrian-friendly 
development that accommodates a range of housing types and affordability 
 
 105. Foster & Glick, supra note 76, at 2053–54. 
 106. Id. at 2054. 
 107. Id. at 2053–54.  This focus on existing communities risks becoming an argument in 
favor of the status quo and, therefore, an argument unlikely to serve the needs of people who 
do not thrive in the status quo—low-income people and disempowered minorities. Christopher 
Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause, 42 VT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017); 
see infra Part III.D. 
 108. Cummings, supra note 100, at 65.  The development in question also implicated 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, which included opportunities for 
public comment and contestation, and public subsidies, which required city council approval 
following a public hearing. 
 109. Id. 
 110. For more on community benefits agreements, see Vicki Been, Community Benefits 
Agreements:  A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 (2010); Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, in BUILDING 
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES:  A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR 
ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 189 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 
2009). 
 111. Tagtachian et al., supra note 12, at 81. 
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levels.112  These codes tend to permit greater density and diversity of uses 
than traditional Euclidean zoning ordinances do.113  Form-based codes 
require that developers design their projects in accordance with the “form”—
the city’s planning mandate.  If a proposed development comports with the 
form-based code, the applicant need not seek additional discretionary 
approvals.114 
The form-based code, prior to adoption, is often the subject of public 
debate and participation.115  Cities and towns that have adopted form-based 
codes typically engage in years of public hearings and outreach prior to code 
adoption.116  Tagtachian, Barefoot, and Harreveld acknowledge that Miami 
hosted hundreds of meetings over the course of more than five years to solicit 
public input about the new code before the city adopted it in 2009.117  
Nevertheless, they decry the developments rendered as-of-right by the 
form-based code.118  They describe large-scale developments, including 
hotel, office space, retail, and housing (both affordable and market-rate), 
approved by the city without any formal, enforceable opportunity for public 
input.119  Because such pathways did not exist for public participation, “the 
community los[t] the leverage that they would have had if the developer 
needed to get a discretionary land use permit in order to build.”120 
C.  Accountability Through Public Participation 
While community organizations make use of existing public participation 
processes,121 both practitioners (like Tagtachian, Barefoot, and Harreveld) 
and scholars argue for even more opportunities for public participation in the 
redevelopment process.  Participation proponents describe existing public 
 
 112. “A form-based code is a land development regulation that fosters predictable built 
results and a high-quality public realm by using physical form (rather than separation of uses) 
as the organizing principle for the code.  A form-based code is a regulation, not a mere 
guideline, adopted into city, town, or county law.” Form-Based Codes Defined, FORM-BASED 
CODES INST., https://formbasedcodes.org/definition/ [https://perma.cc/M4SS-7R52] (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 113. See John M. Barry, Note, Form-Based Codes:  Measured Success Through Both 
Mandatory and Optional Implementation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 305, 314 (2008). 
 114. See Mary Newsom, So, What Exactly IS a Form-Based Code and Why Should Anyone 
Care?, PLANCHARLOTTE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://plancharlotte.org/story/so-what-exactly-
form-based-code-and-why-should-anyone-care [https://perma.cc/MC83-JJHJ]. 
 115. “Like a comprehensive land use plan and resulting implementing land use regulations, 
form-based codes take into account the community’s vision for the municipality as articulated 
through a series of meetings or ‘charettes,’ utilized to reach an agreement on the physical form 
of the neighborhood.” 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 23:3 (rev. 5th ed. 
Supp. 2021). 
 116. “This process can take from as little as one year, but in at least one case took seven 
years to complete.” Id. 
 117. See Tagtachian et al., supra note 12, at 83. 
 118. See id. at 86–88. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Tagtachian et al., supra note 12, at 88. 
 121. I am not, of course, arguing that practitioners should not use the participation 
processes available to them and their clients in order to best represent their clients’ needs and 
desires. 
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participation processes as “relatively minimal,”122 arguing that opportunities 
for public participation come late in the redevelopment process and that 
public testimony is not taken seriously by decision-makers.123  Because 
existing communities embody social capital not accounted for by 
government or incoming private developers, if the redevelopment process is 
to “account for a community’s social capital in land use law and policy,”124 
it must take place “in consultation with the public.”125  Only the existing 
residents have the knowledge necessary to account for existing resources, 
needs, and social capital.126 
Therefore, participation proponents, community development 
practitioners foremost among them, have long advocated for “full 
neighborhood hearings on new construction and ‘general approval’ by 
[current] neighborhood residents as a precondition for new construction.”127  
Professor Audrey McFarlane, commenting on both urban redevelopment 
programs and land use processes, proposes that participation processes ought 
to be longer than is currently typical and institutionalized in “sub-local or 
community-based decision-making bodies.”128  Further, she argues that 
participation requirements must be enforceable, “either in a set of sanctions 
for failure to provide for meaningful citizen participation or, at the very least, 
a guarantee that some level of an ability to affect the outcome of a 
decision-making process is provided.”129  The remainder of this part sets out 
advocates’ and scholars’ arguments in favor of enhanced participation rights.  
I respond to these arguments in Part III. 
1.  Does Local Government Effectively Represent Residents’ Interests? 
Participation proponents argue that local governments are not fully able to 
serve the interests of current residents.  Absent robust public participation, 
the benefits of new development will accrue to outsiders, typically for-profit 
developers, and the costs will be incurred by the existing community. 
According to participation proponents, local government fails residents in 
at least three ways.  First, local government does not have the power to 
negotiate with developers on behalf of residents.  Because subsidy no longer 
 
 122. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices:  A Collaborative Model 
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use 
Decisions II, 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 269, 279 (2005) (noting that “these participatory procedures 
are relatively minimal”) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering II]. 
 123. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices:  A Collaborative Model 
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use 
Decisions, 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 28–29 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering I]. 
 124. Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space:  Social Capital and Urban Land 
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 532 (2006). 
 125. Id. at 546. 
 126. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 279. 
 127. BACH ET AL., supra note 41, at 22. 
 128. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 931. 
 129. Id. at 930.  McFarlane separately argues that “the community must be included early 
within a decision-making process, in fact at the agenda-setting stage of the process.” Id. at 
930.  This argument is consistent with my recommendations in Part IV. 
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plays a significant role in urban redevelopment projects, “city/local 
government has become a weaker player in a more dispersed system of 
influence/power that drives urban development today.”130  Second, 
negotiations are not transparent to residents.  Professor Alejandro Esteban 
Camacho argues that “important land use decisions are frequently made in 
closed-door negotiations that exclude many affected parties, further 
disenfranchising those with the least influence and fewest resources.”131  
Finally, local officials engaged in such negotiation struggle to adequately 
represent varied community interests and sometimes make decisions in their 
individual interests, not those of residents.132 
Process proponents generally make use of the claim that the “growth 
machine” controls local politics, an argument put forth by Professor Harvey 
Molotch in the 1970s.133  “Growth machine” adherents argue that local 
government and local review processes are captured by real estate 
developers.  Real estate developers find common cause with local 
government actors seeking to grow the city and expand the local tax base—
and therefore the value of a city’s real estate—at any cost.134  Partly because 
of such capture, “the community segments most harmed by such favoritism 
[toward real estate developers] are often the same ones who have historically 
been denied influence in local politics, namely low-income and minority 
neighborhoods.”135 
In the eyes of participation proponents, because local government 
privileges developers’ desires and fails to meet residents’ interests, the 
positive impacts of development accrue to the developer and municipality.  
Governmental redevelopment decisions suffer from a “legitimacy 
challenge”:  “The legitimacy challenge arises from the tremendous power 
over neighborhoods’ wellbeing, wielded by politicians whose elections 
depend upon campaign donations and by unelected agency officials with 
limited oversight.”136  Meanwhile, the negative impacts of development 
accrue to the residents of the community undergoing or adjacent to 
redevelopment.  “[T]he negative impacts of such deal-making [i.e., bilateral 
negotiations between locality and developer over zoning approvals] all too 
often fall on community members with little direct influence on the planning 
process.”137  As a result, such bilateral decision-making is illegitimate and 
can only be legitimated by additional collaboration with neighbors and 
 
 130. Foster & Glick, supra note 76, at 2006. 
 131. Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, at 6. 
 132. See id. at 52. 
 133. See generally Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine:  Toward a Political 
Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOCIO. 309 (1976). 
 134. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 280; Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 
123, at 39, 44, 47, 52; McFarlane, supra note 51, at 896, 931 (referring to the disproportionate 
power wielded by “the growth coalition”). 
 135. Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, at 43. 
 136. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 26. 
 137. Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, at 5. 
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community members.138  Professor Carol M. Rose, in a seminal piece, 
described “[p]articipation or voice [as] a particularly venerable legitimator 
of local government,”139 at least as regards minor, nonexclusionary zoning 
adjustments or regional environmental issues.140  In fact, according to 
participation proponents, if there is sufficient public participation, the scope 
of judicial review can be narrowed because “widening public participation 
over the life of agreements should address many of the substantive legitimacy 
concerns that overshadow current land use negotiations.”141 
2.  Do Public Hearings Bring Local Knowledge and Interests to Bear? 
Participation proponents also argue that public participation processes can 
ameliorate information failures by allowing “[c]itizens [to] provide 
informational inputs” where “land use conflicts represent information 
shortfalls.”142  The public hearing process is an opportunity to elicit 
information about potential development impacts that may not be known to 
planning and zoning commissions.  “Information about land use intentions, 
impacts, and valuations is fragmented among a multitude of owners and other 
constituents who are distributed across time and space.  If bargaining were 
costless, this dispersed information would be automatically aggregated in the 
process of making land use deals.”143 
Participation proponents assume that the decisions to be made during the 
land use process are not technical in nature.144  Current residents will be the 
most affected by the redevelopment, and current residents have valuable 
 
 138. “[A] nuanced conception of public regulation rooted in collaborative governance 
theory can legitimize negotiated land use regulation by incorporating principles of local and 
regional equity and deliberative democracy.  By reformulating the negotiation and 
implementation processes to include a more multilateral and adaptive orientation, negotiated 
approaches to land use regulation can foster civic engagement and cooperation, achieving not 
only fairer but also more effective land use decisions.” Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, 
at 7; see also Edward W. De Barbieri, Urban Anticipatory Governance, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
75, 87 (2018) (“Developing stakeholder buy-in leads to greater legitimacy of outcomes.”). 
 139. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:  Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 883 (1983).  Planning and Dealing focuses on 
“piecemeal changes in local land regulations,” decisions that have implications beyond local 
boundaries. Id. at 841.  In the years since it was published, however, economists have 
developed a richer understanding of the extraordinary degree to which local land use 
regulations have detrimental extraterritorial impacts on both affordability and segregation. 
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary 
Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 317 (2004); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of 
Zoning on Housing Affordability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8835, 
2002); Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation, 
AM. ECON. J.:  MACROECONOMICS, April 2019, at 1, 2; Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of 
Inequality:  How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443 
(2020). 
 140. See Rose, supra note 139, at 846 (setting out an analysis of local government 
legitimacy as to “piecemeal local land decisions”). 
 141. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 304–05. 
 142. Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (2013). 
 143. Fennell, supra note 142, at 388. 
 144. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 322, 325–26. 
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knowledge, experience, and preferences that ought to inform the 
redevelopment process.145  Professor Rose argues that land use hearings are 
akin to negotiations between interested parties, not judicial determinations 
applying the law to a set of judicially determined facts.146  As a result, 
[a]ny meaningful determination of the specific needs and preferences of 
parties affected by a land use project depends on the expression of these 
needs and preferences through direct public participation.  In this sense, 
project-specific land use decisions are essentially and fundamentally land 
use mediations, the resolutions of which ultimately depend on knowledge 
of local conditions and interests, not technical expertise.147 
To the extent development decisions turn on matters not currently within the 
knowledge of existing residents, the process itself will educate them:  
“Engaging participants in a public process generally leads to them being 
better informed and more educated.”148 Thus, proponents of public 
participation argue that additional public participation can legitimate 
redevelopment decisions by balancing the costs and benefits between outside 
developers and inside neighbors.149 
3.  Does Public Participation Result in Progressive Redistribution? 
Participation proponents argue that enhanced public participation 
processes will include traditionally excluded voices and will result in greater 
redistribution from the wealthy to the poor.  Again, participation proponents 
assume that the people most affected by redevelopment are those who reside 
in the area to be redeveloped.  Because, as evidenced by the urban renewal 
period, redevelopment can irreparably disrupt the existing community, robust 
public participation processes are necessary to protect the resources and 
social capital in that community. 
Proponents argue that extensive participation processes serve an 
instrumental function by redistributing the benefits of redevelopment from 
wealthy outsiders to low- or moderate-income residents.150  Sherry R. 
 
 145. “Greater opportunities for public involvement are proposed as an antidote to these 
democracy deficits, to enhance accountability and transparency, and to produce better 
informed and thus improved results.” Bezdek, supra note 48, at 26; see also Camacho, 
Mustering II, supra note 122, at 273 (arguing for “planning processes [to be] more 
participatory and open”). 
 146. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 147. Camacho Mustering II, supra note 122, at 326. 
 148. De Barbieri, supra note 138, at 87. 
 149. Of course, public processes and adjudications need not include public participation in 
order to serve an educational purpose.  All open proceedings, whether or not public 
participation is permitted, serve an educational purpose.  Professor Judith Resnik recounts 
Jeremy Bentham’s commitment to open judicial proceedings in part because he believed they 
functioned to educate the populace.  In her words, “all of us have entitlements in democracies 
to watch power operate and to receive explanations for the decisions entailed.  The observers 
are, in this account, a necessary part of the practice of adjudication.” Resnik, supra note 29, 
at 209.  Open proceedings that do not permit public participation ought to play a larger role in 
land use administration, a point to which I return in Part IV. 
 150. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 48, at 30; Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 
315; McFarlane, supra note 51, at 930. 
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Arnstein’s 1969 essay on citizen participation in the planning process151 is 
particularly influential.  Arnstein argues that participation redistributes 
power.152  Only robust participation processes meet the “heavy burden of 
countering marginalization of poor black communities and residents.”153 
When existing residents lack capital, they cannot exert power by 
participating in the marketplace by purchasing and redeveloping land.  They 
therefore look to the political sphere to influence the space in which they live.  
The political sphere is also susceptible to vastly unequal power dynamics, 
but participation proponents argue that public participation plays an 
equalizing role.  “Scholars studying urban politics recognize the value of 
public participation as a means to reduce existing power asymmetries in 
political decision-making.”154  Where use of the public participation process 
pressures a developer to promise a portion of the development profits to 
individual community actors through a community benefits agreement, 
“[the] outcome is redistributive because it extracts greater resources for the 
community through bargaining than it would otherwise be entitled to under 
law.”155 
The redistribution argument is bolstered by the notion that wealthy 
communities have long exerted control over their built environment.  “This 
movement has grown directly from the increased power of low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods.  They have demanded the same degree of 
control for themselves long exercised in the wealthier districts.”156  In the 
interest of fairness, then, low-income communities ought to have the same 
power.157 
 
 151. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 
216 (1969). 
 152. Id. at 216 (Citizen participation “is the strategy by which the have-nots join in 
determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, 
programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out.  In short, it 
is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share 
in the benefits of the affluent society.”). 
 153. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 897. 
 154. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 32. 
 155. Cummings, supra note 100, at 71–72. 
 156. BACH ET AL., supra note 41, at 29. 
 157. It is notable, however, that when the political process fails to advance the concerns of 
the wealthy, they turn to the marketplace.  They can purchase land rather than see it developed 
for uses they dislike.  They can leave a neighborhood that no longer suits their preferences.  In 
fact, their ability to leave amplifies their voices at public participation proceedings as they can 
credibly threaten to move their homes and their tax dollars to another municipality if their 
current town evolves in ways they do not like. See, e.g., LISA PREVOST, SNOB ZONES:  FEAR, 
PREJUDICE, AND REAL ESTATE 93–100 (2013) (recounting the failed redevelopment of a parcel 
in tony Darien, Connecticut:  when wealthy neighbors could not stop the construction of a 
mixed-income development through the typical public participation processes, an anonymous 
donor gave the local land trust enough money to purchase the parcel and hold it as vacant land 
in perpetuity); see also Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Opposition to Defendants Incorporated 
Village of Garden City’s, Garden City Board of Trustees’ and Nassau County’s Motions for 
Summary Judgment at 22, MHANY Mgmt. Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Garden City, 985 
F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 05-cv-2301), 2011 WL 13262332 (“Another resident 
compared his idea of the specter of multi-family housing . . . to the ‘full families living in one 
bedroom townhouses, two bedroom co-ops,’ ‘overburdened and overcrowded’ schools and 
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4.  Does Public Participation Have Intrinsic Value? 
A final argument in favor of public participation is its “intrinsic value.”158  
Professor McFarlane identifies arguments that local decision-making around 
land use and development is an appropriate forum for direct democracy, or 
something like it.159  Because public participation processes serve an 
educational function, they facilitate the very construction of the 
community.160  Recognizing that this idealized version of public 
participation is rare, McFarlane nevertheless argues that even where 
participation does not manifest as productive discourse, “meaningful 
participation . . . is ultimately participation that is really an act of 
resistance.”161 
D.  Is Poor People’s Participation Different? 
Cummings, Glick, Foster, Tagtachian, Barefoot, and Harreveld all 
represent or work alongside community organizations made up of poor 
people and oftentimes people of color.  They do not share the same 
motivations as the white, suburban crowd that booed my client.  On the one 
hand are wealthy, typically white, community participants who have long 
benefited from exclusionary practices.  On the other are poor, often Black, 
community participants who, as a result of racism, poverty, and white flight, 
have never exercised control over their neighborhoods and should perhaps 
be entitled to different rights and protections.  Today, the minority of poor 
people who live in now-desirable neighborhoods, for the first time, have 
some ability to use the participation process to ensure that they benefit from 
market-rate development. 
In the context of local control of land use decision-making, many have 
tried to differentiate between strains of resistance to new development: 
[D]evelopment in neighborhoods currently populated primarily by people 
excluded from other neighborhoods by racial and ethnic discrimination in 
the past (and in some places, still today) now threatens to impose burdens 
that the residents are not choosing to assume.  That critical difference raises 
 
‘overrun’ sanitation that he and his wife had intended to leave behind when they moved out 
of Queens County.”), aff’d sub nom. MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 
(2d Cir. 2016); MHANY, 985 F. Supp. at 402 (“I moved here from Brooklyn so that when I 
walked out of my house I did not turn to my left and see apartment buildings.” (quoting another 
resident’s comment in opposition)); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, Tex., 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 
546 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (“We lived in Mesquite for 17 years . . . and we left because of the 
terrible effects that high-density development can have on what would otherwise be a great 
neighborhood.” (alteration in original) (quoting resident’s comment at town council meeting 
in opposition to multifamily project)). 
 158. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 902. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 912 (“[P]articipatory deliberation and action educates people to see their 
common interests, and therefore, community grows out participation.”).  But see infra note 
249 and accompanying text. 
 161. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 928. 
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a host of legal and social justice issues that need to be confronted 
forthrightly.162 
Usurpations of local control have long distinguished between “good” local 
control and “bad” local control.163  Is it possible to make similar 
differentiations in connection with public participation? 
Professor Andrea J. Boyack distinguishes between those seeking to 
address negative externalities of a proposed development and those simply 
seeking to exclude potential neighbors.164  Those engaging in exclusion will 
always claim that they, too, are simply seeking to exclude negative 
externalities.165  Nevertheless, Boyack’s distinction has intuitive appeal.  She 
recognizes that “[t]he value preserved in upholding a community’s right to 
exclude is an aspect of ‘status property,’ and protection of status typically 
 
 162. Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 217, 248 (2018); see also John 
Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1271, 1315, 1322–25 
(2020) (acknowledging that there are policy reasons to provide additional process rights to 
historically disempowered communities, but proposing instead to provide residents of 
gentrifying neighborhoods transferable development rights). 
 163. For example, anti-snob zoning laws, which date back to the 1960s, do not apply in 
towns where a certain minimum percentage of local housing stock is already affordable, 
however that term is defined by statute. See Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in 
Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV. 293, 303 (2019). 
 164. See generally Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451 (2017). 
 165. Affordable housing opponents are often sophisticated enough to couch their 
opposition in concerns about the environment and traffic safety.  Often, they resist openly 
stating that they are opposed to new neighbors or housing for low-income people. See, e.g., 
Alexander Cramer, ‘Square Peg in a Round Hole.’  Neighbors Say Proposed Apartment 
Complex Doesn’t Belong., PARK REC. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.parkrecord.com/news/ 
summit-county/square-peg-in-a-round-hole-neighbors-say-proposed-apartment-complex-
doesnt-belong/ [https://perma.cc/QX2W-QZ88] (quoting residents’ general opposition to 
affordable housing on environmental and traffic grounds and noting that some residents 
expressed “support for affordable housing projects in general, but opposed this specific 
proposal”); Molly Kraus, Zucchini-gate or Bust:  Berkeley’s Battle for Affordable Housing, 
BERKELEY POL. REV. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/10/31/zucchini-gate-or-
bust-berkeleys-battle-for-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/B6HL-N54L] (describing 
resident’s objection to a proposed housing project based on concerns about reduced light on 
her garden); Max Marin & Michaela Winberg, “Fecal Samples” Against Gentrification?:  
Research Activism Raises Red Flags in West Philly, BILLY PENN (Mar. 29, 2021, 5:10 PM), 
https://billypenn.com/2021/03/29/west-philly-poop-study-fecal-matter-gentrification-
development-research-temple-gauthier/ [https://perma.cc/7TB9-TQUE] (describing 
antidevelopment research study “to investigate if the development would adversely affect the 
neighbors’ microbiota and increase the risk of developing colorectal cancer”); Jessica 
Williams, Plan for Affordable Housing in Leonidas, Lower Garden District Faces 
Neighborhood Criticism; Mayor, City Council in Support, NOLA (Sept. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_f47834c8-ed3e-11ea-8560-8763bdb26542.html 
[https://perma.cc/8MGB-VU9J] (quoting assertion that public criticisms of an affordable 
housing project’s design, while purportedly based on historic preservation and building safety 
issues, were in fact a pretext for “protesting the arrival of low-income neighbors, who are often 
Black and Brown”); see also Mai Thi Nguyen et al., Opposition to Affordable Housing in the 
USA:  Debate Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 HOUS., THEORY & SOC’Y 107, 
119–20 (2013) (collecting examples of affordable housing opponents “appropriat[ing] 
‘rational’ planning jargon and socially acceptable language,” such as concerns over traffic and 
overconcentration of poverty, “in order to frame the message of their opposition”). 
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benefits society’s ‘haves’ at a cost to society’s ‘have nots.’”166  She worries, 
however, that “similar goals to preserve a neighborhood’s character also 
motivate community efforts to exclude in a very different context:  resistance 
of development by poorer, ethnic enclaves.”167 
Professor Boyack does not seek to solve the problem by providing 
different public participation rights to different categories of participants.  
Instead, she proposes that the ultimate decision-maker undertake a utilitarian 
analysis of whether a community ought to be entitled to exclude:  “A 
community’s right to exclude is unjustifiable unless its purported benefits 
outweigh its costs, including costs borne by society and various would-be 
community residents.”168  Using “community exclusionary powers . . . to 
promote property values or group identity rather than to combat a legitimate 
problem of negative externalities or a true tragedy of the commons” should 
be disfavored, in Boyack’s analysis, by land use decision-makers.169  In fact, 
extensive informal public participation mechanisms would render Boyack’s 
solution less feasible.  Her solution would best be accomplished in an 
administrative process that required data collection and analysis in addition 
to public comment. 
Professor Rachel Godsil differentiates categories of public participants not 
on the basis of exclusionary motivation but, instead, on the grounds that 
urban redevelopment is less subject to extensive land use regulatory review 
than is suburban greenfields development.  According to Godsil, “our legal 
system has adequate mechanisms in place, such as zoning and 
subdevelopment permitting requirements, to address community interests in 
the context of a suburb or small town.”170  In existing urban spaces, on the 
other hand, land use laws do not provide a mechanism for residents to 
participate in the decisions that lead to neighborhood change.171  The 
renewed interest of well-off people in an existing neighborhood, because it 
does not require a change in use, cannot be addressed through land use 
decision-making.  For example, the conversion of a multiunit brownstone to 
a single-family home does not “require zoning changes.  This means that 
in-place residents of gentrifying neighborhoods lack many of the current land 
use controls that others utilize to protect their autonomy, and new devices are 
needed to afford that protection.”172  Godsil’s argument assumes that the 
contested changes in urban neighborhoods do not require zoning changes.  
While that is true in the case of a brownstone reverting to single-family use, 
it is not necessarily true more broadly.173 
 
 166. Boyack, supra note 164, at 466. 
 167. Id. at 464. 
 168. Id. at 481. 
 169. Id. at 483. 
 170. Rachel D. Godsil, The Gentrification Trigger:  Autonomy, Mobility, and Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 319, 324 (2013). 
 171. See Godsil, supra note 170, at 334; see also FLORIDA, supra note 84, at 58–60. 
 172. Godsil, supra note 170, at 334. 
 173. In fact, I argue below that redevelopment projects are typically more difficult, partly 
because of public participation processes, than are “greenfields” projects. See infra notes  
315–17 and accompanying text. 
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Meanwhile, “the in-place residents in neighborhoods subject to 
gentrification consider their neighborhoods to have been intentionally 
abandoned and allowed to deteriorate by both governmental actors and the 
forebears of the people now seeking to ‘gentrify.’”174  Residents of 
neighborhoods undergoing gentrification lack “autonomy,” which is a 
function of both racism and market power.  “Once gentrification is 
contextualized as part of the continuum that includes exclusion from suburbs, 
denial of resources, and white abandonment of cities, the paradox is 
explained.  Gentrification of predominantly Black and Latino neighborhoods, 
like housing discrimination and exclusion, denies autonomy to the in-place 
residents.”175  Land use laws do not provide a mechanism for existing 
residents, long disempowered by government housing subsidies and the real 
estate market, to opine on, much less influence, changes in their 
neighborhood.  “The move of suburbanites back to cities may be seen as 
continuing a cycle in which others exercise autonomy, while poor people of 
color often lack a corresponding choice.”176 
Notably, Professor Godsil’s answer is not more participation or local 
control but, instead, subsidies for existing residents to stay in neighborhoods 
that experience dramatic housing cost increases.177  Godsil would provide 
vouchers, as-of-right, to residents of existing neighborhoods that see a 
25-percent increase in cost in a two-year period.178  Again, narrowing and 
limiting public participation processes would not affect Godsil’s solution to 
the problem of gentrification.  Similarly, Professor John Infranca opts not to 
provide additional participation requirements, for fear that the enhanced 
process will have unanticipated negative consequences, but instead proposes 
the allocation of transferable development rights to long-term residents to 
compensate them and provide a market-based mechanism that would allow 
them to benefit financially when their neighborhoods change.179 
Others, starting from baseline assumptions similar to Godsil’s, Infranca’s, 
and Boyack’s, argue in favor of differential treatment of different categories 
of public participants.  Urban planner Thomas Rudel argues that “more 
effective land-use planning may require a concerted effort to democratize the 
regulation of real estate development”180 and further argues that such 
democratization will vary by geography: 
In suburbs it may involve measures to insure the presence of disadvantaged, 
elderly homeowners in decision making processes; in cities it may involve 
legislation to facilitate citizen initiatives in land-use planning.  In both 
instances the reforms would increase the likelihood that land-use 
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authorities will pursue policies which reflect the sentiments of a wide range 
of their constituents.181 
Others do not ignore the fact that extensive, powerful, informal public 
participation processes can privilege “bad” NIMBYs,182 but they decline to 
opine on the specific contours of what the participation process should look 
like.183 
Can the design of public participation in the land use realm empower the 
historically disempowered?  Answering that question requires understanding 
the hazards of public participation, which I endeavor to describe in the next 
part. 
III.  HOW PARTICIPATION WORKS 
“The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach:  no one is 
against it in principle because it is good for you.” 
—Sherry R. Arnstein184 
I am not the first community development lawyer to quote Arnstein’s 
comparison of public participation to vegetables.  But I might be the first to 
wonder whether it is possible to have too much of a good thing.  As an 
affordable housing developer’s lawyer eating loads of spinach, how do I 
remember those hearings described in the first pages of this Article?  
Hundreds of neighborhood residents turned out to decry the local housing 
authority’s plans to redevelop a forty-year-old housing development.  The 
current complex includes fifty studio and one-bedroom units, limited to 
occupancy by elderly and disabled individuals.185  The housing authority’s 
redevelopment plans increase the number of units to sixty-seven and open 
 
 181. Id. at 131–32. 
 182. NIMBY is an acronym for “Not In My Backyard.”  It was originally used to describe 
residents objecting to siting noxious uses, but “NIMBYism has grown substantially over 
time.” FLORIDA, supra note 84, at 24.  Today, NIMBY residents in both cities and suburbs 
routinely object to the development of new housing units in their neighborhoods or 
municipalities, with serious consequences for housing prices, housing segregation, and the 
environment. Been, supra note 162, at 218, 221–23, 227–35. 
 183. See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 51, at 931 (“Of course, these recommendations in 
some ways are directed at the easy question:  Why is participation important?  The harder 
question of how to implement participatory schemes remains unanswered . . . .  The answer to 
the hard questions will necessarily be determined by the circumstances and context of 
particular places.”).  Anti-snob zoning laws effectively distinguish between towns that should 
have control over local zoning and those that should not. Lemar, supra note 163, at 303.  These 
same laws, by cabining local control, similarly limit the import of public participation in those 
towns whose zoning powers are cabined as a result of their failure to produce affordable 
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 184. Arnstein, supra note 151, at 216. 
 185. While housing discrimination based on “familial status” is illegal under the federal 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(e), in 1988, Congress enacted an exception, further 
refined in 1995, that permits housing developments to limit occupancy to elderly residents. 
See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(d), 102 Stat. 1619, 
1622–23 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)); Housing for Older Persons Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-76, §§ 2–3, 109 Stat. 787, 787 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3607(b)(2), (5)). 
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occupancy to all low-income people, without regard to age or disability 
status.  Half of the new units will be two-bedroom units that can 
accommodate families.  Nothing riles up suburbia like the threat of 
low-income children infiltrating the school district.  The town residents who 
turned out to oppose the project made no effort to hide their vitriol.186 
Of the over one hundred project opponents, as far as my students and I 
could tell, all were white.  In fact, the only people of color in the room were 
one of my students and me.  Most opponents were middle-aged, though a few 
brought teenage children with them.  Many were loud.  They cheered when 
a commissioner or witness said something they liked.  They jeered when 
someone said something with which they disagreed.  On multiple occasions, 
they physically accosted the chairperson of our client’s board.  The chair of 
the commission repeatedly asked them to quiet down so as not to disrupt the 
meeting.  In an effort to hear all public comments, the chair held the agenda 
item over multiple meetings, lasting over three months in total, and permitted 
people to speak more than once, thus privileging the loudest, most strident 
voices.  Extending the hearings caused my client to miss a once-a-year 
funding application deadline, only adding to the costs imposed by the 
delay.187 
Just a few of the current project tenants attended the hearings.  Even fewer 
testified.  One who did, the president of the tenants’ association, described 
his daily ordeal:  crawling out of his wheelchair to use the bathroom in his 
studio apartment, constructed years prior to the passage of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  Most tenants, however, citing the stress and difficulty 
of testifying in favor of a project despised by so many of their neighbors, 
refused to testify.  They feared being heckled by the audience.  Their 
disabilities did not permit them to testify in front of over one hundred people.  
The forum simply did not work for them.  It is further worth noting that no 
potential future tenants—or a group representing their interests—testified 
either. 
In other words, in the midst of the commissioners’ efforts to maximize 
public participation, the process silenced many voices.  Elderly and disabled 
tenants feared testifying.  And many supporters of the project opted to write 
 
 186. Some might wonder whether the process I describe here would have proceeded 
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letters of support or letters to the editors of the local newspapers rather than 
appear in person.  One such letter writer bemoaned the tenor and substance 
of the hearings: 
Lately, there has been a lot of concern in my neighborhood about the 
[proposed public housing] renovations . . . .  [S]ome have used derogatory 
terms to describe potential new residents of [the public housing].  This 
appears to be based on prejudice due to the ‘low income’ designation of the 
apartments.  I do not take issue with people expressing their concerns about 
the [public housing] renovations, but I do take issue with people expressing 
their views at the expense of the dignity of others.  When we characterize 
an entire group of people as deficient due to an attribute of that group—
skin color, sex, religion, or income—we divide our neighborhoods and only 
damage our sense of community.  Discussions marked with respect and 
concern for all involved are certainly more representative of the [town] that 
we all know and love.188 
Indeed, discussions were instead marred by vitriol, fear, and unfounded 
assumptions about affordable housing residents.  Town resident William 
Woermer testified: 
The drug addicts are going to be here, believe me.  Retirees, disabled, old 
people—I have no objection to renovate the whole place and make it nice 
for them.  But don’t get too much of that riffraff in.  There will be a lot of 
riffraff.  Then we go onto, with a project like this, you need security guards 
in the area.189 
The proceedings were horrible, but they were also quite typical.  As 
journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones recounted in a recent event hosted by the 
National Low Income Housing Coalition, white communities become 
“almost violent” in their opposition to affordable housing if they think Black 
and Brown people will move in.190  We have long known that public 
participation in land use processes operates differently than it does in other 
administrative spheres.  A 1983 lecture delivered at the Institute on Planning, 
Zoning, and Eminent Domain provided a how-to for opponents of 
applications for zoning approvals.  George A. Staples, a lawyer citing his 
representation of developers, opponents of developers, and municipalities in 
support of his claim that his “views are totally impartial, completely without 
bias, and absolutely objective,” started by pointing out that opponents rarely 
need a “professional presentation.”191  Instead, “the most effective opposition 
to zoning [approvals], particularly in the smaller city, is warm bodies, the 
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warmer the better.”192  Staples then proceeded to list “a number of 
time-tested techniques which should be used” in every attempt to oppose a 
grant of zoning approval: 
Disparage renters as those who have no investment in their property.  Talk 
about loss of property values . . . .  Speak of the home being the only 
investment of the residential property owner . . . .  Talk about potential 
garbage problems.  If there is little public transportation in the area, mention 
that there is no bus service to get these low-class folks to work.  Talk about 
the adverse effect of cramming people together into small places . . . .  
Mention pressure on schools and possible increases in taxes to provide 
services for multifamily developments . . . .  Talk about high density.  (This 
term has very little meaning, but it is a real fight phrase.) . . .  Talk about 
inappropriate access and increased traffic which will endanger school 
children, particularly small elementary school age children.  Anytime there 
is a zone change, you can always talk about the violation of the existing 
plan and a breach of faith with those who purchased in reliance on the 
existing zoning.  Nobody really knows what planning is, so you are free to 
talk about bad planning.193 
The list will sound familiar to anyone who has attended a zoning hearing, 
urban or suburban, where a new multifamily development is under 
consideration.  Staples further advises: 
[I]t is advantageous to encourage your people to grumble and make 
derisory noises every time the opposition makes a point and to clap loudly 
any time one of your own speakers makes a point or sits down.  Be sure to 
bring crying babies to the council room so that the board will realize that 
you are so concerned that you are willing to deprive the poor little tykes of 
sleep in order to stamp out this terrible evil being proposed.194 
Staples suggests that opponents engage in “a bit of local chauvinism” by 
talking “about how great this community is and how we have to protect it 
against becoming another downtown Chicago,” even if nothing about the 
proposed development (such as a sixty-seven-unit apartment building on five 
acres of land) is akin to a Chicago skyscraper.195 
Staples acknowledges that this approach is “silly” but argues (accurately, 
in my own experience) that “it is also very effective.”196  Staples strongly 
advises both developers and municipalities to seek legal counsel and engage 
professional engineers to make their case and decide the case, 
respectively.197  Project opponents, on the other hand, are advised that a 
“logical presentation and an effective spokesman,” while “not absolutely 
necessary,” might “add a whole lot of class to the operation,” which ought to 
do whatever is necessary to “persuade the board to reject this fiendish plan 
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to destroy their neighborhood.”198  If “whatever is necessary” includes 
exaggeration and lies, no worries.  Staples further comforts “the 
squeamish . . . that there is little legal recourse against those who tell great 
lies and spread atrocious nonsense at zoning hearings.”199 
The advice Staples gives resides squarely in the category of “Funny 
Because It’s True.”  The notion that it is possible for public participation fora 
to facilitate “discussions marked with respect and concern for all”200 is a 
fundamental tenet of community development practice.  But does that notion 
accord with reality?  In practice, 
[b]ecause public hearings afford no real dialog, they lack the elements 
necessary for a truly deliberative decision-making process.  Public hearings 
are a poor form for the development of adequate information about 
complex community problems, do not promote a shared baseline of 
understanding, and do not even attempt to promote a consensus.201 
At best, then, they provide a forum for individual members of the public 
to list grievances, one at a time, not in discussion with one another, in 
three-minute increments.  But, as anyone who has attended a local public 
hearing or watched an episode of Parks and Recreation knows, public 
hearings and other opportunities for participation can further devolve from 
there. 
A common response to the query why local land use law administration 
does not resemble other regulatory regimes is that local control, infused with 
lots of opportunities for public participation, lends legitimacy to a 
particularly personal realm of administrative law.  Perhaps informal 
processes are appropriate where the topic approaches the personal—and 
nothing is quite as personal as one’s neighborhood and neighbors.  
Recognizing this sensibility, in a recent article, Professors David Markell, 
Tom Tyler, and Sarah F. Brosnan use survey data to assess people’s 
preferences as to how best to resolve land use disputes, especially in a context 
where those disputes involve not only monetary but also sentimental 
value.202  They found that respondents best trusted referenda to protect 
sentimental value but preferred to submit land use disputes to judicial 
procedures.203  In other words, the desire to protect sentimental value did not 
dictate their choice of venue, and respondents prioritized protecting monetary 
value over protecting sentimental value.204  Nevertheless, Markell, Tyler, and 
Brosnan argue that in a realm where “sentimental values are important, 
procedural justice is particularly important to stakeholders.”205  Depending 
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on the context, procedural justice might require a neutral decision-maker, or 
it may require public decision-making in the form of a referendum.206 
While the framework is helpful, it does not dictate a conclusion.  This part 
describes various failures of public participation fora.  These failures ought 
to inform proposals to redesign public participation processes, a task I 
undertake in Part IV. 
A.  Public Participation Provides a Forum for Local Prejudice and 
Misinformation 
Public participation proponents often cite the importance of local 
knowledge in determining how best to craft a real estate development 
project.207  Residents have lived experience with local traffic patterns, noise, 
crime, and other aspects of living in a neighborhood.  Public participation 
proponents argue that local knowledge is necessary to craft an appropriate 
redevelopment project.208  While they, like Professor Carol M. Rose, may 
acknowledge that locals lack technical expertise, public participation 
proponents nevertheless advocate for hearings and charrettes, arguing that 
these serve as educational fora.  Participation serves procedural goals:  “to 
publicize issues, to draw in interested parties, to examine alternative 
solutions, and to satisfy the public that the issues have been fully 
explored . . . .  [T]hey give interested persons a sense of participation in the 
decision . . . .”209 
It is hard to square theoretical insistence on knowledge sharing and 
dialogue with the experience of attending public hearings related to the 
planning process, whether related to comprehensive planning, rezonings, or 
approvals for individual projects.  This should not be a surprise.  “Passing 
judgment on the efficacy of a land use decision requires extensive speculation 
about proposed future actions.  Unlike disputes about liability for past actions 
such as nuisance and trespass claims, zoning disputes present largely 
counterfactual fact questions.”210  Resident expertise does not lie, however, 
in predicting the impacts, from traffic to nearby property values, of a 
proposed development project.  Local expertise lies, instead, in describing 
the current neighborhood and expressing desires for the neighborhood’s 
future.  These are necessary, but not at all sufficient, elements of an effective 
neighborhood planning process. 
In fact, local accounts of the effects of a proposed development often 
conflict.  Where neighbors disagree, one will accuse the other of seeking to 
cash out.  Where an expert opinion contradicts residents’ preferences, 
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residents do not seek to understand complicated engineering reports and 
traffic studies.  Instead they retrench, discredit expert opinions procured “for 
hire,” and insist on the merits of local knowledge over outsiders’ expert 
opinions.  Residents insisting that the traffic volume is higher than a traffic 
study suggests will argue that the expert conducted the study on a slow day.  
Rarely do residents leave a room having questioned the assumptions with 
which they walked in.211 
Public hearings do not resemble the rational, problem-solving dialogues 
described by participation proponents.  They consist largely of one person 
after another using the allotted time to recite the assumptions with which they 
entered the room, refusing to question those assumptions, cheering others 
who hold the same assumptions and jeering at people who do not.  These are 
often more shouting matches than conversations.  They certainly are not 
dialogues that result in an informed consensus. 
In one telling example drawn from legislative advocacy work done by the 
clinic that I teach, a homeowner sought a special permit to expand her 
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POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS 118, 120 (2020) (describing one resident who 
“commissioned his own traffic study as he feels the impact of cars and children on the area 
have not been adequately addressed” and another who “critiqued a developer’s traffic study 
and stormwater analysis” based on his own engineering knowledge).  But see Jerusalem 
Demsas, How to Convince a NIMBY to Build More Housing, VOX (Feb. 24, 2021, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/22297328/affordable-housing-nimby-housing-prices-rising-poll-data-
for-progress [https://perma.cc/E3PN-FT3S] (describing poll results showing that strong 
economic arguments for upzoning may be more effective in shifting voter opinions).  The 
death of local journalism only exacerbates this problem.  No impartial source exists to make 
sense of the morass of contradictory information presented at land use hearings.  Untrained 
journalists, operating Patch and Patch-like websites, serve as mouthpieces for NIMBYs.  
Neighborhood-based social networking sites, such as Nextdoor, are even worse. See RANDY 
SHAW, GENERATION PRICED OUT:  WHO GETS TO LIVE IN THE NEW URBAN AMERICA 197 (2020) 
(describing online organizing efforts on Nextdoor to defeat pro-density and affordable housing 
legislation in Noe Valley, California); Kate Walz & Patricia Fron, The Color of Power:  How 
Local Control over the Siting of Affordable Housing Shapes America, 12 DEPAUL J. SOC. 
JUST., Winter 2018, at 1, 9 n.29 (describing opposition to Chicago mixed-income development 
project in “a closed Facebook group” whose members “frequently posted thinly veiled 
comments rooted in racist and classist misconceptions about affordable housing and voucher 
holders”). 
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home-based day care.212  Applicable state law prohibits towns from erecting 
zoning and other local law barriers to state-licensed home-based day cares 
that serve no more than six children.213  This means that no town can override 
a person’s right to operate such a day care.  Unfortunately, towns are 
permitted to require operators of larger home-based day cares, serving 
between seven and twelve children, to seek zoning approvals.214  A child care 
provider in Fairfield County, Connecticut, sought to expand her existing 
program, which served six children, to serve twelve children.215  The Zoning 
Board of Appeals denied the provider’s application twice.216  As required by 
the local zoning code,217 notice of the public hearing at which her application 
would be considered was delivered to her neighbors.218  One of her neighbors 
organized the other neighbors in opposition to the project.219 
The applicant’s neighbors testified against issuance of the permit.220  
Unaware that land use approvals often devolve into popularity contests, the 
applicant had not rallied anyone to testify in support of her application.221  It 
quickly became clear that the neighbors’ “local knowledge” contradicted 
objective truths.  First, they made claims about the provider’s expertise in 
child care,222 refusing to acknowledge that she was, in fact, licensed by the 
State of Connecticut223 and had a certification in early childhood 
education.224  Nothing in the record suggested that the applicant, an African 
American immigrant, was inexperienced.  Second, and crucially, until they 
received notice of the application to increase the day care capacity, the 
 
 212. See Hearing on S.B. 87 Before the Conn. Gen. Assembly Hous. Comm., 2021 Leg. 98 
(Conn. 2021) [hereinafter S.B. 87 Hearing] (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma 
Maison Childcare). 
 213. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3j (2021) (“No zoning regulation shall treat any family 
child care home . . . in a manner different from single or multifamily dwellings.”); id. § 19a–
77(a)(3) (defining a “family child care home” as “a private family home caring for not more 
than six children”). 
 214. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2(d)(1) (West 2021) (“Zoning regulations . . . 
shall not . . . [p]rohibit the operation of any family child care home or group child care home 
in a residential zone”), with id. § 8-3j (providing only that family child care homes—not group 
child care homes—must be treated the same as “single or multifamily dwellings” by applicable 
zoning regulations).  See also id. § 19a–77(a)(2)(A) (defining a “group child care home” as a 
facility in which “not less than seven or more than twelve related or unrelated children [are 
cared for] on a regular basis”). 
 215. S.B. 87 Hearing, supra note 212 (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma 
Maison Childcare). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See STAMFORD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS § 19.C.3(a) (2021). 
 218. See Zoning Board of Appeals, CITY OF STAMFORD, at 2:34:25–2:34:35 (May 9, 2018), 
http://cityofstamford.granicus.com/player/clip/7118?view_id=19&redirect=true. 
 219. S.B. 87 Hearing, supra note 212 (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma 
Maison Childcare). 
 220. See Zoning Board of Appeals, supra note 218, at 3:09:52–4:13:22. 
 221. See id. at 2:34:02–4:19:35 (showing testimony from many opponents of Ms. Lauture’s 
application and testimony from only Ms. Lauture and her attorney in support of the 
application). 
 222. See id. at 4:01:12–4:01:31. 
 223. S.B. 87 Hearing, supra note 212 (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma 
Maison Childcare). 
 224. Id. 
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neighbors were all unaware that a day care already operated on the site.225  
Whatever their concerns about noise and parking might have been, surely the 
fact that they had never noticed six children making noise and six families 
dropping off children at the site daily ought to have been informative. 
In a recent interview, Warren Logan, an Oakland transportation planner, 
describes the problem succinctly.  Individuals have important knowledge 
about their daily commutes.  Every day they make informed decisions about 
how to get to work efficiently.  As a transportation planner, Logan wants to 
hear directly from commuters, especially those least likely to attend a formal 
public meeting.  Logan acknowledges, however, that commuters’ knowledge 
has limits: 
If you ask a lot of people . . . what would you do to fix the congestion 
problem, they might say ‘widen the road.’  And from an engineering 
standpoint, that is the last thing you should do.  That’s where a 
transportation planner has to wrestle with what people might assume would 
be the best solution, and what is technically the best situation, without being 
[paternalistic].226 
Note that while some public participation is willfully ignorant or dishonest, 
Logan worries that even well-intentioned (but inexpert) participation can 
have nefarious impacts on local development and governance decisions. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that when a development is built despite public 
opposition, it often does not yield the negative impacts anticipated by public 
testimony.  One frequently hears from neighbors of once-controversial 
development projects:  “Now that it’s in, it’s ok.”  One of the most 
contentious real estate developments of the last century was the Ethel R. 
Lawrence Homes, the affordable housing project built as a result of Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.227  Neighbors 
decried the development’s potential nefarious impacts:  lower property 
values, more crime, more traffic, and overburdened public schools.228  The 
project was built only after decades of civil rights litigation.229  Examining 
the impacts of the Ethel R. Lawrence Homes on both residents and neighbors, 
researchers found that none of the claimed nefarious impacts came to pass.230  
Neighbors were even wrong about the impact on property values, a data point 
one might assume could be reliably crowdsourced.231  The development had 
 
 225. See Zoning Board of Appeals, supra note 218, at 3:03:22–3:03:32, 4:14:00–4:14:10. 
 226. Sarah Holder, A City Planner Makes a Case for Rethinking Public Consultation, 
CITYLAB (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/08/city-
planning-transportation-oakland-community-engagement/596050/ [https://perma.cc/U9UA-
RV6L]. 
 227. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (finding that New Jersey municipalities must zone in 
furtherance of statewide general welfare and, in doing so, accommodate the development of 
affordable housing). 
 228. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL:  THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 44, 46 (2013). 
 229. See id. at 41–43. 
 230. See id. at 65–70. 
 231. See id. at 118–19. 
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significant positive impacts on the people who moved in,232 none of whom 
were “existing residents” or “neighbors” whose views would have been 
credited or prioritized during the public participation process. 
Relatedly, as Professors Katherine Levine Einstein, David M. Glick, and 
Maxwell Palmer recount at length, participants in public processes often 
present irrelevant information.233  An apartment building in a suburban town 
might, for example, require public hearings in the context of receiving 
approval from an inland wetlands agency or a board of zoning appeals.  The 
applicable statute will establish what information is relevant to the agency or 
board’s decision.  Perhaps the inland wetlands agency must consider 
drainage and the possibility that the development will increase the frequency 
of local floods.  Members of the public will often appear and testify as to 
wholly irrelevant matters.234  A common example is professed concern for 
public finances, where a member of the public will argue that the 
development will increase government expenditures, by increasing crime or 
the population of school-age children, and fail to bring in commensurate 
property tax revenues.  The argument is wholly irrelevant to the question at 
hand but undoubtedly has an impact on the board or agency members hearing 
it.  There is no mechanism to limit such comments, much less their effect on 
decision-makers. 
Professor Rose acknowledges that public processes can involve more 
venting than information sharing.235  She argues, however, that public 
processes remain valuable because they facilitate mediated decisions that are 
less likely to lead to litigation.  Unfortunately, the mediated results are 
generally predictable and often bad.  Public participation processes, as 
documented by researchers, decrease the amount of new housing constructed 
and increase the number of parking spaces.236  Both of these “mediated” 
results inflate housing prices with little commensurate societal benefit.237  As 
one recent paper concluded, “the degree of political opposition to housing 
development predicts higher prices” and, because “[o]pposition to housing 
development is more likely in areas with highly educated non-Hispanic 
White residents,” there are implications for segregation.238  Where the results 
predictably preference a privileged subset of the citizenry, mediation is not a 
legitimizing force. 
 
 232. See id. at 148–84.  Because of the overwhelming demand for the units at Ethel 
Lawrence Homes, tenants were selected on a “first come first served” basis. See id. at 62.  The 
tenant selection process made it possible for researchers to compare life outcomes between 
those who were selected and those who were not. See id. at 125.  It also created a situation in 
which, even if public participation processes had been open to and inclusive of future 
residents, those future residents had very little incentive to participate, because any one 
potential tenant had a small chance of success in obtaining a unit, even if it were built. 
 233. See EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 87–88, 92–93. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See Rose, supra note 139, at 898. 
 236. See EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 53. 
 237. Id.; see also DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 152–53 (2005). 
 238. ROTHWELL, supra note 9, at 11. 
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Because public hearings impose minimal constraints on public testimony, 
public participation processes do not provide a mechanism for resolving 
conflicting testimony or preferences.  Even literature lauding the ability to 
meet progressive goals by using public participation processes recognizes 
that the community does not speak with one voice.  Professors Foster and 
Glick, for example, describe various entities claiming to speak on behalf of 
the community in the context of Columbia University’s expansion plans in 
West Harlem.239  Ironically, Glick’s client, a nonprofit community group 
governed by low-income neighborhood residents, questioned the legitimacy 
of the Community Board, a hyperlocal governmental structure erected in 
response to the failures of urban renewal.240  Professor Cummings describes 
a divide between community organizations in Los Angeles, not on the 
substance of the redevelopment proposal, but on the question of whether the 
agreement between the coalition and the developer ought to require the 
groups to cede the right to challenge the redevelopment’s approvals during 
the local administrative process.241  Under these circumstances, it is not at all 
clear that public participation yielded a “better” result, as conveyors of local 
knowledge disagreed.  Disagreement among locals can lead to confusion, 
delay, and additional costs.  Professor Einstein tells the story of an affordable 
housing development incurring over one year of delay and $100,000 of 
additional costs to address neighbor concerns regarding traffic, only to be 
delayed further by a second group of neighbors who were not involved in the 
first dispute.242 
B.  Public Participation Protects Social Capital, but the Wrong Kind 
There may be reasons why low-income communities merit public 
participation rights, even when such rights are inappropriate in wealthy 
communities.  Low-income communities may be heavily reliant on spatially 
constrained social capital.243  As just one example, in her book All Our Kin, 
Professor Carol B. Stack documents the ways in which low-income Black 
communities rely on family and friends for daily needs, such as child care.244  
New development might disrupt those relationships by displacing a friend or 
relative or increasing transportation time between a child’s home and her 
 
 239. Foster & Glick, supra note 76, at 2010, 2016.  Foster and Glick also discuss a 
controversy over which community group, if any, had the authority and legitimacy to represent 
existing residents of central Brooklyn in connection with the large-scale redevelopment of 
Atlantic Yards. Id. at 2025. 
 240. Id. at 2050. 
 241. Cummings, supra note 100, at 66 (noting that various groups “split over the final terms 
of the agreement, with AGENDA and the community coalition refusing to sign on as coalition 
members, citing the waiver of the right to oppose the project as incompatible with their 
organizational missions”). 
 242. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 26. 
 243. “Social capital” refers to “the ways in which individuals and communities create trust, 
maintain social networks, and establish norms that enable participants to act cooperatively 
toward the pursuit of shared goals.” Foster, supra note 124, at 529. 
 244. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN:  STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 
90–107 (1974). 
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grandmother’s.  Low-income families lack the wealth and income to easily 
replace such relationships with marketplace transactions.  It might be more 
crucial to maintain social capital networks in low-income communities than 
it is in more well-off communities, where a decrease in social capital might 
have less devastating negative impacts.245  Professor Sheila Foster endorses 
New York City community organizations’ advocacy to protect community 
gardens cultivated on municipally owned lots as one example of social capital 
meriting protection.246  New York City sought to sell the lots to housing 
developers.247  Foster does not expressly say it, but presumably one reason 
that it is especially important to protect community gardens in low-income 
neighborhoods is that community residents cannot easily replace those 
resources once lost.  On the other hand, one might be skeptical of a wealthy 
suburb “conserving” land on which a developer seeks to develop affordable 
housing because the town’s residents likely do not lack access to open 
space.248 
Social capital, however, is a fraught concept.  While in popular literature 
it is presumed to be an unmitigated good, in reality, social capital has a dark 
side.249  It can be used either to include—bridging social capital250—or 
exclude—bonding social capital.251  Relying on social norms rather than 
legal rules to ensure that public participation is dialectic, inclusive, and 
productive is not likely to be a successful strategy. 
In fact, exclusionary bonding social capital is more common than 
inclusionary bridging social capital.252  The former cements insular 
communities while the latter brings disparate groups together.  Even the most 
lauded of public participation processes, upon examination, are often 
examples of bonding, not bridging, social capital.  Crafting participation 
processes requires determining who the participants ought to be.  The more 
limited the community, the easier it is to define and meet its needs.  
Communities based on sharing a common space, such as a workplace or 
neighborhood, are likely to be better organized than those based on some 
other common trait.  Broader communities are more likely to include 
 
 245. In insular wealthy communities, if the social capital disrupted is bonding, rather than 
bridging, the disruption may actually have positive impacts.  (For explanations of bonding and 
bridging social capital, see infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.)  Successful 
desegregation efforts might fall into this category of positive social capital disruptions. 
 246. See Foster, supra note 124, at 575–76. 
 247. See id. at 535. 
 248. See supra note 157.  Well-off suburbs and their residents routinely purchase land 
slated for multifamily housing and, instead, dedicate it to “conservation.” See Ellickson, supra 
note 12, at 1616; Thomas, supra note 189; PREVOST, supra note 157, at 99–100. 
 249. See generally Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town:  The Social Capital 
Revolution in Residential Property Law, 99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013). 
 250. Id. at 819. 
 251. Id. at 818. 
 252. See id. at 841 (“Bridging capital often has a limited radius, necessitating a plethora of 
bridging ties to ensure broader solidarity (for example, labor unions bridged across race but 
not income).  And once achieved, bridging ties and capital may morph into bonding capital.  
While bridging capital has some value to residential property, it is doubtful that it can fully 
remedy the negative externalities of local bonding capital.”). 
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divergent perspectives and desires that then need to be mediated and 
compromised.  As a result, the project of defining the community is more 
likely to be exclusionary than inclusionary. 
Where historic and current racial discrimination and segregation have 
created the community in question, the notion of community is even more 
problematic.  In fact, some of the most active participation fora are those 
focused on exclusion.  Professor Barbara L. Bezdek cites both business 
improvement districts (BIDs) and suburban NIMBYs as examples.253  The 
problem, however, is not specific to these public participation processes.  As 
one academic planner observing land use processes in a range of New 
England towns, from rural to urban, noted:  “Governments with jurisdiction 
over large numbers of people tend to serve unusually heterogeneous 
constituencies . . . .  [T]he racial, ethnic, and class differences within [an 
urban] constituency make it difficult for residents to build the coalitions 
necessary to challenge the developers’ control of the regulatory process.”254 
A difficulty of using social capital and community preservation theory to 
undergird policy is that it is not easy to define social capital with precision.  
Commentators are quick to conflate social capital with a predetermined good.  
As Professor Stephanie M. Stern describes it, “social capital is present when 
positive effects accrue . . . .  [T]here appears to be no upward bound on the 
amount of social capital deemed optimal for communities.”255 
Returning to urban renewal’s textbook example, one New Haven 
neighborhood, Wooster Square, is often held up, in contrast to the rest of the 
city, as an urban renewal success story.256  As you might hear the story from 
a local tour guide, having seen the failures of urban renewal in other New 
Haven neighborhoods, Wooster Square residents organized to protect their 
neighborhood when it was targeted for construction of I-91.257  For much of 
the twentieth century, Wooster Square was a tight-knit community comprised 
mostly of Italian immigrants and their descendants.258  They successfully 
convinced local and federal authorities to reroute the proposed highway a 
few blocks east of the neighborhood heart, Wooster Square Park.259  They 
also persuaded authorities to allocate money to renovate existing housing 
rather than raze it and replace it.260  Luisa DeLauro, who later served as the 
neighborhood’s alder for a record-setting thirty-five years, and her husband 
 
 253. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 15; see also Smith, supra note 51, at 264; Kenneth A. Stahl, 
The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 509–10 (2017). 
 254. RUDEL, supra note 180, at 124. 
 255. Stern, supra note 249, at 818. 
 256. Adrien A. Weibgen, There Goes the Neighborhood:  Slums, Social Uplift, and the 
Remaking of Wooster Square 2 (Yale L. Sch. Student Legal Hist. Papers, No. 24, 2013), 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=student_leg
al_history_papers [https://perma.cc/2LRX-UZL8]. 
 257. See id. at 8–10. 
 258. See id. at 4–6. 
 259. See id. at 9–10. 
 260. See id. at 14–16, 39. 
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Ted led the movement.261  Today, a sculpture dedicated to DeLauro sits in 
Wooster Square Park.  It is a stylized kitchen table, intended to pay homage 
to DeLauro’s own kitchen table, said to be the headquarters for the 
community organizing campaign.262 
Like the sculpted kitchen table, the tour guide account is stylized.  It 
excludes a significant portion of the history.  The location to which I-91 was 
rerouted was also a residential portion of Wooster Square.263  Urban renewal 
in Wooster Square did in fact raze housing—the housing occupied by the 
poorest Wooster Square residents.264  In its place, urban renewal built a 
highway and, on the other side of the highway, cleared plots for light 
industrial development.265  The Wooster Square public participation process 
was successful in part because it excluded people.266  Organizers limited the 
community they represented to residents between Olive and Hamilton 
Streets, a span of just half a mile.267  Nearly everyone east of Hamilton 
Street268 was displaced to make way for I-91 and light industrial 
development,269 just as residents of Oak Street270 and the Dixwell 
neighborhood had been displaced in the preceding decades.271  In fact, almost 
8000 people, the residents of 70 percent of housing units in Wooster Square, 
were displaced.272  More people were displaced during Wooster Square’s 
 
 261. See Mary O’Leary, Luisa DeLauro, Mother of Connecticut U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro, 
Dies at 103, NEW HAVEN REG. (Sept. 10, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.nhregister.com/news/ 
article/Luisa-DeLauro-mother-of-Connecticut-U-S-Rep-12187053.php 
[https://perma.cc/P5BR-SE7N] (noting that “the DeLauros had a lot of influence in finding 
homeowners who used . . . tax credits and renovation grants to fix up neglected properties in 
the area”).  Luisa DeLauro’s daughter, Rosa DeLauro, has served as the neighborhood’s 
congresswoman since 1991. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 12–13. 
 264. See id. at 10. 
 265. See id. at 26–27; COHEN, supra note 54, at 130. 
 266. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 19–24. 
 267. See id. at 19. 
 268. The one housing development permitted to remain standing was a public housing 
project called Farnam Courts. See id. at 11.  For decades, Farnam Courts stood sandwiched 
between I-91 and a coal-fired power plant, until the power plant was shuttered in 1992. See 
English Station, NEW HAVEN BLDG. ARCHIVE (Apr. 27, 2019), https://nhba.yale.edu/ 
building?id=58e6b948adb817121752a5f4 [https://perma.cc/TRB9-A5YM]. 
 269. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 8–13. 
 270. See id. at 14, 22, 24.  At the time it was destroyed, the Oak Street neighborhood was 
very diverse and included African American, Jewish, Irish American, and Italian American 
households. See id. at 22; RAE, supra note 54, at 137, 271. 
 271. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 51.  Dixwell was then and is now the smallest 
neighborhood in New Haven.  As of 2017, Dixwell’s population was just 5000 people.  
INSPIRED CMTYS., INC. & DATAHAVEN, NEWHALLVILLE AND DIXWELL NEIGHBORHOOD 
COMMUNITY INDEX 2 (2019), https://www.ctdatahaven.org/sites/ctdatahaven/files/ 
Newhallville_Dixwell_Neighborhood_Index_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T3F-Q3PH].  
Nevertheless, it was historically the commercial and cultural center of New Haven’s Black 
community. See MANDI ISAACS JACKSON, MODEL CITY BLUES:  URBAN SPACE AND ORGANIZED 
RESISTANCE IN NEW HAVEN 55, 67–69 (2008). 
 272. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 51. 
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urban renewal “success story” than during the rest of New Haven’s urban 
renewal horror stories.273 
One need not rely on historical examples to make this point.  Digging 
deeper into Foster’s account of community gardens, one finds community 
activists seeking to protect a limited resource for their own benefit at the 
expense of a larger pool of people who could use the land if it were developed 
as housing.274  The social capital story is not straightforward.  If the gardens 
served as a venue for socializing and community organizing across existing 
communities, however defined, perhaps they advanced bridging social 
capital—which is not easily replaced.  If, however, they served preexisting 
insular communities, they were hardly irreplaceable.  If the plots were few 
and limited, it is far from clear that the gardens served a greater good than 
additional housing did.  In fact, by pushing rents for existing housing down, 
the construction of new housing might have served to advance existing social 
capital by limiting displacement. 
In her examination of community meetings, even in an urban 
neighborhood, sociologist Eva Rosen expressly found that “although low- 
and middle-class blacks live in close proximity, this does not lead to the 
creation of bridging social capital.”275  In her in-depth examination of the use 
of housing choice vouchers in a low-income, Black Baltimore neighborhood, 
Rosen finds that community meetings are generally attended by local 
homeowners who are skeptical and weary of the role that renters and 
voucher-holders play in their neighborhood: 
These “community” meetings are in fact only attended by a very particular 
segment of the community.  Not only were they older.  Not only were they 
largely homeowners.  They were homeowners who lived in [relatively 
well-off pockets of the neighborhood] . . . .  And fewer renters know about 
the community meeting.276 
Rosen recounts attending one such meeting with Sue, a Black renter and a 
lifelong neighborhood resident.  Even though Sue is the same race as the 
majority of other community residents in the room and occupies a similar 
income stratum, she does not feel comfortable participating in the meeting.  
In practice, the community meeting is for homeowners, not renters, and she 
knows her input is not welcome.277  As Rosen describes it: 
The “community” meeting was only geared toward a certain segment of the 
community.  It’s an example of bonding social capital, where people with 
things in common—in this case homeowners—can share information and 
skills and gain access to resources such as the energy grant.  But the 
 
 273. See id. 
 274. See Foster, supra note 124, at 535–36 & n.29. 
 275. EVA ROSEN, THE VOUCHER PROMISE:  “SECTION 8” AND THE FATE OF AN AMERICAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD 184 (2020). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. (“Although Sue is an unassisted renter in Oakland Terrace, she grew up in a family 
with a similar class background as many of the meeting attendees.  Yet she felt alienated at 
the meeting because she was one of the few renters, and her concerns and needs were different 
from those of the residents at the meeting.”). 
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community meeting fails to build bridges across groups—even though it 
could do so in theory—because its agenda is constructed by a single group 
of people, that is, homeowners.278 
Because exercising social capital through local community meetings and 
local government processes is likely to result in insularity, it actually 
“increase[s] the need for legal safeguards.”279  Land use public processes are 
not immune:  “[s]ocial capital theory itself may justify land use 
protectionism.”280  Social capital cannot serve as a blanket rationale for 
public participation.  A more nuanced understanding of social capital ought 
to inform a redesigned role for public participation.281 
C.  Public Participation Redistributes Wealth and Resources, but in the 
Wrong Direction 
Arguments about social capital preservation are explicit in the community 
development and land use literature.282  In theory, public participation 
opportunities also provide a mechanism to counterbalance low-income 
people’s inability to participate in the marketplace.283  Today, low-income 
communities lack control over their neighborhoods in part because they 
cannot leave their neighborhoods.  Market power requires the ability to exit 
and to exercise purchasing ability.  Low-income residents have less ability to 
exit both because of irreplaceable social capital and because of their lack of 
wealth.284  Moving is expensive.  And the more desirable a neighborhood is, 
the higher the cost of housing in that neighborhood.  Because poor people 
cannot effectively participate in the marketplace, perhaps they require a 
greater ability to participate in the public process around real estate 
development. 
The majority of low-income people who live in low-income 
neighborhoods, however, cannot exercise power and influence by testifying 
at local land use hearings simply because, without new development, there 
 
 278. Id. at 185–86. 
 279. Stern, supra note 249, at 820. 
 280. Id. at 849. 
 281. Notably, Stern takes a cautious approach, not advocating against all devolved 
decision-making but, for example, arguing for a “more cabined role for neighborhood direct 
democracy programs.” Id. at 856. 
 282. See supra Part III.B. 
 283. Presumably, the effects of urban renewal on communities of color would have been 
substantially less disastrous had displaced families had the resources to depart for more 
desirable neighborhoods.  That is, in fact, what happened to white families displaced by urban 
renewal who, unlike their Black counterparts, enjoyed access to subsidized mortgage lending 
and a welcoming suburban housing market. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW:  A 
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 65, 70, 74 (2017).  
As Rothstein recounts, the housing market was not just unfriendly to Black individuals, it was 
violent—and that violence was undertaken under color of law. 
 284. Notably, the inability to exit or credibly threaten to exit also dampens the efficacy of 
low-income people’s exercise of public participation rights.  As Carol M. Rose puts it, “the 
opportunity for exit has been a constant threat behind voice at the local level.” Rose, supra 
note 139, at 886. 
1128 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
are no land use hearings to attend.285  The value of increased participation 
opportunities accrues only to people living in the places facing development 
pressures.  Public participation empowers only those people who live in 
neighborhoods attractive to developers, and those people are 
disproportionately well-off.  Most low-income neighborhoods are not facing 
gentrification pressures.286  Only a small minority of all low-income people 
reside in desirable, gentrifying neighborhoods.287 
Finally, while participation proponents cite a need to counterbalance 
developers’ market power, they do not often acknowledge the power 
imbalances inherent to public participation fora.  There is nothing inherently 
inclusive about participation.288  And the political sphere often replicates the 
inequities apparent in the economic sphere.  It is hardly surprising, then, that 
researchers studying participation processes find that participants are not 
representative of the broader population289 and that participants’ 
contributions are not valued equally.290 
Researchers find that participants testifying at Boston-area land use 
hearings are whiter, wealthier, and more opposed to housing development 
than the population of the neighborhoods in which they reside or voters in 
those neighborhoods.291  Even in wealthy towns, the people who participate 
in land use hearings are still wealthier than their average neighbor.  
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Unsurprisingly then, almost two-thirds of mayors nationwide report that 
while “policy areas like schools and policing [are] dominated by majority 
public opinion,” when it comes to housing development, “a small group with 
strong views” dominates public discussion.292 
Other research concludes that even where participation is widespread, 
authorities use race and class to prioritize some voices over others.  “[Setting 
participation as a goal] assumes that government can employ neutral tactics 
and obtain a fair result even in the face of significant hierarchies of 
power,”293 but there is no reason to make such an assumption.  In fact, 
participants with less formal education, less wealth, and less political power 
can be “systematically disempowered by the formal planning process, so that 
their voices carr[y] less weight in decisions.”294  A host of illegitimate factors 
will influence a decision-maker’s willingness to take testimony seriously.  
Researchers posit that those factors include homeownership status,295 the 
likelihood that participants might bring litigation to enforce their preferences, 
and participants’ ability to make political donations or otherwise influence 
the electoral process.296  These factors vary positively with household wealth 
and income.  As a result, public participation processes do not counteract 
wealth and income disparities; they exacerbate them. 
Even the most vocal proponents of robust public participation recognize 
the power differentials that manifest in these processes: 
The applause [for the principle of citizen participation] is reduced to polite 
handclaps, however, when this principle is advocated by the have-not 
blacks, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos, and whites.  
And when the have-nots define participation as redistribution of power, the 
American consensus on the fundamental principle explodes into many 
shades of outright racial, ethnic, ideological, and political opposition.297 
In the context of public participation processes associated with 
environmentally hazardous land uses, a key member of the environmental 
justice movement noted that these processes, far from being progressive in 
their impact, redistributed environmental resources from poor to rich: 
While the drafters of environmental laws may have thought those laws were 
“neutral,” their application has caused the inequities in the siting of 
unwanted facilities.  The result of the laws is unequivocal:  poor people and 
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people of color bear a disproportionate share of environmental burdens. 
And while we may decry the outcome, environmental laws are working as 
designed.298 
When public participation motivates decision-making, formal rules and 
standards suffer.  “Lacking substantive standards, such statutes depend on 
the vigor of the political process for achieving environmental goals.  In the 
end, it is those with political clout who win in the administrative process or 
siting decision.”299 
Even within racial and class groups, public participation prioritizes and 
entrenches status differentials.300  Homeowners have more legitimacy than 
renters.  Long-standing, and therefore older, residents have more legitimacy 
than recent transplants, who will generally be younger.  The identity of 
participants and the perspectives they provide are predictable and, as 
recounted above, the tone of the hearings is angry.301  As a result, people 
with conflicting perspectives choose not to participate.302 
Where an administrative body fails to advance redistributive goals despite 
public participation, the public participation requirement itself does not 
provide a mechanism to challenge the substance of the decision.  Public 
participation requirements are procedural in nature and, where they are not 
met, they give rise to procedural attacks.  Such attacks can delay 
development, sometimes enough to kill a development, particularly given the 
cyclical nature of real estate markets.303  While the settlement process might 
further redistributive goals, there is no guarantee that this will take place.  In 
fact, the mediated settlement often involves concessions that increase the cost 
of housing, a result contrary to progressive goals.304  A well-designed public 
participation process ought to tackle and address these power differentials. 
D.  Public Participation Prioritizes Current Residents, but at the Expense 
of Everyone Else 
As described above, public participation proponents routinely assume that 
the people most affected by a real estate development project already live in 
the neighborhood where the development will take place.305  This assumption 
is echoed in public participation processes, which prioritize existing resident 
voices in formal and informal ways.  Formally, only neighbors typically 
receive notice of public hearings mailed to their homes.306  Some zoning 
enabling acts and zoning codes also require posted notice in addition to 
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mailings307 but, again, existing residents are the people most likely to see the 
posted notice.  Informally, planning and zoning commissioners tend to 
prioritize the voices of existing residents.  When delivering testimony, people 
commonly describe themselves not as neighbors or residents, but as 
homeowners, and recite the length of their tenure in the neighborhood, all to 
secure legitimacy in the eyes of the people—themselves disproportionately 
homeowners—making land use planning decisions.308 
Certainly, existing residents are affected by new development in a way that 
others are not.  New construction may deviate from their previous 
expectations as to what local resources their property affords them, 
regardless of whether the property is owned by a homeowner or leased by a 
tenant.  Courts and legal scholars have long prioritized owners’ expectations 
when considering whether certain property rights ought to be protected.309 
Prioritizing the preferences of existing residents makes neighborhood 
change more difficult.  Even if one assumes that existing communities 
deserve more say in development than outsiders do, the tools available to 
existing communities are crafted to delay development and preserve the 
status quo, rather than to encourage the development of beneficial goods and 
resources.  Zoning codes that prioritize the status quo risk sacrificing one of 
the key characteristics of the urban environment:  dynamism.310  
Demographics change.  Average household size changes.  The average 
number of children per family changes.  The average age at which people 
become parents changes.  Birth rates go up, and birth rates go down.  Housing 
preferences evolve.  The nature and location of jobs and industry respond to 
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technological innovation and economic booms and busts.  Transportation 
costs rise and fall. 
Neighborhoods, particularly those proximate to amenities, must evolve as 
well.  Too often neighborhoods are not allowed to change as a result of land 
use regulations, whether aesthetic strictures tied to existing context or 
prioritization of existing residents in decision-making.311  As a result, quality 
of life suffers because households are not able to find housing that meets their 
needs and preferences.  Poor households are most likely to lose when demand 
outpaces supply.  It is no surprise, then, that empiricists studying public 
participation in land use hearings worry that “rather than empowering 
under-represented interests, these institutions could, in fact, be amplifying 
the voices of a small group of unrepresentative individuals with strong 
interest in restricting the development of new housing.”312  In practice, when 
residents are asked to respond to changes in their community, they will opt 
for the status quo over new development.313 
1.  Everyone Else Incurs the Costs of Sprawl 
When law makes public participation core to the redevelopment process, 
development will be easier and cheaper in places where there is no public to 
participate.  Unfortunately, urban redevelopment is significantly more 
difficult than greenfields development, which uses farmland and forest land 
to build housing, rather than redeploy sites in the urban core adjacent to 
transit and jobs.314  Redevelopment requires engaging in land assemblage 
and wading through messy title histories and encumbrances.315  Urban sites 
are often brownfields, requiring cleanup and assignment of existing and 
potential liabilities to those harmed by pollutants.316  Despite these 
hindrances to development, urban parcels are expensive as a result of their 
proximity to transportation infrastructure and jobs.317 
One oft-overlooked component of the urban redevelopment process is the 
cost and indeterminacy resulting from public participation.  Developers can 
identify zoning requirements by reading a zoning code and can do so before 
incurring significant predevelopment expenditures.  No one, however, can 
predict what is likely to arise out of the public participation processes.  Those 
processes, moreover, do not begin until developers invest significant funds 
in the design and engineering process.  Public participation, therefore, puts 
significant predevelopment expenditures at risk.  Subdividing a farm into 
one-acre residential lots is not likely to affect any existing residents and is 
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unlikely to give rise to public outcry.  Because low-income people are less 
likely to participate in public meetings and receive less credence from 
decision-makers, public participation processes may also direct 
redevelopment projects to poor neighborhoods rather than wealthy ones, 
potentially resulting in displacing gentrification.318 
Requiring the expenditure of significant predevelopment dollars before 
one can apply for approvals does not simply raise the cost of development.  
It also erects a barrier to entry for those developers who cannot afford to risk 
predevelopment expenditures.  Expensive predevelopment processes 
privilege large-scale developers who diversify their risk across multiple 
projects.  Developers with the political power to push through despite public 
opposition benefit from barriers to entry erected by public participation 
processes.  Such processes disadvantage small-scale developers. 
Extensive, unpredictable public participation processes, then, are simply 
one additional barrier to redirecting housing development from sprawling 
suburbs to existing infrastructure in already-developed cities and suburbs.  
And because the processes privilege the participation of well-off neighbors, 
they also direct development away from desirable, well-resourced, wealthy 
neighborhoods to low-income neighborhoods with less political power to 
oppose development. 
2.  Everyone Else Incurs Higher Housing Costs 
Public participation processes also enable anticompetitive behavior by 
homeowners.  The trope of the all-powerful developer looms large in the 
arguments of those who seek to increase local residents’ opportunities to 
participate and influence private development.319  Recent empirical work, 
however, calls into question the hypothesis that developers control local 
politics.320  As theorized by Professor Robert Ellickson as early as 1977, and 
subsequently developed further by Professor William Fischel, homeowners 
exert disproportionate power in the planning process—and they exert their 
power in order to stymie, rather than to encourage, development.321 
While both developers and tenants have an interest in abundant supplies 
of housing, landlords and homeowners do not.  “The residential owner role 
in particular comprises a perceived prerogative to exert control over housing 
supply and the social composition of residents . . . .  [I]t is not surprising that 
land cartelization and NIMBYism are little-questioned aspects of residential 
life.”322  Homeowners and landlords use the regulatory tools at their disposal 
(i.e., zoning laws) to limit construction of new housing.  Zoning is often “the 
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product of entrenched economic interests engaging in protectionism and 
burdening the broader public to further their own economic interests.  The 
politics of property protection change considerably with increased attention 
to these dynamics.”323 
Homeowners not only act in their self-interest—property value 
preservation and inflation—they conflate their self-interest with the public 
interest.  Processes that preference the “community” and define the relevant 
community as current residents or homeowners embrace a kind of “greed is 
good” approach to policymaking.  Homeowners at land use hearings 
frequently testify that a zoning decision is in the public interest only if it 
inflates or preserves property values.324  “Social capital theory thus 
entrenches private-regarding norms by eliding a balancing between broader 
social benefits and local group interests and claiming that action to advance 
the latter will provide the former.”325  Conflating homeowners’ self-interest 
with the public interest then “deters communication to understand the needs 
of the larger community.”326 
In fact, homeowners can be analogized to cartels.327  Robert Ellickson first 
posited an economic model centered on the monopolistic behavior of 
homeowners in a 1977 article.328  Cartels coordinate behavior among firms 
in an effort to inflate prices and maximize profits to cartel members; one 
mechanism is to depress production of a good.329  As a result, buyers overpay 
and “scarce capital [remains] in the hands of persons who are not using it 
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efficiently.”330  Because cartels involve multiple producers, they must 
include a mechanism by which producers coordinate behavior.331  Zoning 
codes play this role in the case of homeowners depressing housing production 
and inflating housing prices.  While cartels are typically prohibited by 
section 1 of the Sherman Act,332 in the case of housing, “the suburban land 
cartel is more effective than traditional cartels because members can openly 
coordinate behavior and have a perfect mechanism to enforce mutual 
compliance:  zoning law.”333 
Because they are comprised of multiple firms, each of which can act on its 
own, cartels, unlike monopolies, are fragile creatures.  Each member stands 
to profit by breaking away from the cartel.  As a result, the cartel must create 
and enforce a mechanism to prevent each member’s departure.  In order for 
a cartel to sustain itself, it must have mechanisms both to know when an 
individual member has broken away and to punish individual members when 
they do so.  As Professor Christopher Leslie explains, 
[c]artels try to create stability through enforcement regimes.  In order to 
deter cheating and to remedy cheating when it occurs, stable cartels need 
to develop enforcement mechanisms that monitor the sales (and prices) 
of cartel members, penalize firms that sell more than their cartel allotment, 
and compensate those who have not received their agreed-upon share of 
the cartel profits.334 
Cartelization, then, often requires two stages.335  In the first stage, the 
actors “reach[] a consensus on a plan to restrict output or otherwise curb 
rivalry.”336  In the second stage, the cartel must track each member’s output 
and punish those who overproduce.337  All the while, the cartel must erect 
barriers to entry by new firms not subject to the cartelization plan.338  Zoning 
serves multiple functions in this schema.  It is the primary enforcement 
regime that applies to any firms that enter after adoption of the cartelization 
plan.  It also serves as a barrier to entry, barring firms that might desire to 
produce more housing than set out in the cartelization plan.339 
 
 330. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market:  The Economics of Inclusionary 
Zoning, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 61 (1996). 
 331. See Christopher R. Leslie, Balancing the Conspiracy’s Books:  Inter-Competitor Sales 
and Price-Fixing Cartels, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018). 
 332. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 333. Dietderich, supra note 330, at 61. 
 334. Leslie, supra note 331, at 1, 2. 
 335. Randall D. Heeb et al., Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms:  Implications for the 
Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 216–17 (2009). 
 336. Id. at 217. 
 337. See id. 
 338. See id.  While this analysis focuses on the need for the cartel to manage individual 
homeowners, it is also the case that, for exclusionary zoning to have effects on the larger 
market, there is also the need for a cartel manager to manage across local governments.  
Ellickson analyzes the management of the cartel across localities. See Ellickson, supra note 
321, at 434. 
 339. By upzoning statewide, states can limit local authority to zone in ways that limit or 
strip supply constraints from the zoning code.  These interventions go to the heart of the 
homeowners’ cartel’s efforts to constrain supply so as to increase price. 
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Within that larger regime, public hearings before planning and zoning 
boards serve an important function.  Public hearings permit the cartel to track 
individual members’ commitment to the profiteering enterprise.  The loudest 
objectors to a project will solicit signatures on petitions and donations to fund 
lawyers.  They will ask their neighbors to put up lawn signs and testify at 
hearings.  The public hearing process gives cartel leaders an opportunity to 
determine if there are cartel members at risk of breaking away.  It also permits 
the cartel to punish those who do not commit themselves to the cartel.340  
Homeowner cartels abuse the power allocated to individual actors in the land 
use planning process.  In the words of one scholar, “[a]lthough the right to 
exclude may be an essential stick in property’s metaphorical bundles, it is a 
right to be exercised by and for the benefit of individuals, not a tool for 
inequitable, collective control.”341 
While at least one scholar acknowledges that conventional arguments in 
favor of public participation empower NIMBYs alongside the urban poor,342 
no public participation proponent proposes a mechanism by which to 
distinguish the disenfranchised poor from the well-connected rich.  Damon 
Y. Smith argues that urban poor public participants are not guarding the 
status quo but simply trying to influence the nature of the change.343  He does 
not set forth a normative position that would permit courts or other 
decision-makers to distinguish between the two. 
As described in this part, project-specific public participation is an 
ineffective approach to addressing gentrification and other problems facing 
low-income communities.  Worse, by facilitating exclusion in well-off 
neighborhoods, it exacerbates the housing affordability crisis. 
Ultimately, the question of what role public participation ought to play is 
one of institutional design.344  What should the public participation process 
look like?  Who are the decision-makers, how are they selected, and at what 
points in the process do they make their decisions?  In various spheres of 
local government, these questions are contested constantly, from whether to 
have elected or appointed boards of education,345 to what powers ought to be 
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project opponent implored the commissioners to understand that, consistent with New 
England’s puritanical roots, there were and there ought to be “social strictures, there were 
social behaviors—this is the land of shunning and social regulation on what people would 
build, what people would wear.” Application of Thomas and Elizabeth Halsey for a Certificate 
of Design Appropriateness to Construct a New Single Family Dwelling at 28 Potter Court, at 
30 (Noank Fire Dist. Zoning Comm’n July 17, 2012) (transcript on file with author). 
 341. Boyack, supra note 164, at 497. 
 342. Smith, supra note 51, at 256–57. 
 343. Id. at 266. 
 344. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 682. 
 345. See Sam Brill, The Law of School Catchment Areas, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 
364 (2019). 
2021] OVERPARTICIPATION 1137 
held by civilian review boards in the policing context.346  Part IV proposes a 
redesign of land use public participation. 
IV.  REDESIGNING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESSES 
It is not enough to say that public participation is important.  The design 
of community engagement processes matters.  Only a well-designed process 
can ensure that “countervailing interests and community groups . . . assert 
their views, to hold governments and other actors to account, and to claim a 
share of governing power.”347 
Crafting an effective community engagement forum requires responding 
to the various ways in which existing public participation processes fail, not 
just their potential to succeed.  When public participation motivates 
decision-making, formal rules and standards suffer.  As argued above, 
current public participation structures preference some voices over others, 
put a thumb on the scale in favor of the status quo, and fail to ensure that 
irrelevant, often false, information does not drive the decision-making 
process.  As a result, public participation processes delay development, direct 
development to poor neighborhoods and greenfields, and increase the cost of 
housing.348  A redesigned public participation process ought to avoid these 
results.  An effective public participation system must account for the way in 
which the current system disadvantages already disadvantaged voices, 
redistributes wealth upwards, equates local knowledge and local self-interest, 
stifles change, and slows housing development to the detriment of housing 
affordability. 
State zoning enabling acts and local zoning ordinances ought to prioritize 
public participation where local knowledge is necessary and relevant to 
decision-making.  Simultaneously, these laws must acknowledge where local 
knowledge is irrelevant at best.349  And they ought to require rigorous data 
collection, investigation, and analysis in addition to—and as a check 
 
 346. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 701.  As Professor Monica C. Bell has 
explained in the criminal justice context, community engagement can take many forms. See 
Monica C. Bell, The Community in Criminal Justice:  Subordination, Consumption, 
Resistance, and Transformation, 16 DU BOIS REV.:  SOC. SCI. RSCH. ON RACE 197, 198 (2019).  
It can be transformational, upending policymaking and perceptions about what is possible. Id.  
More frequently, however, even people who are not abused by and even benefit from the 
existing system exert no control over that system. Id.  They do not influence it, they simply 
enjoy its benefits, while being lucky not to be subjected to its failures. 
 347. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 690. 
 348. K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship:  Exclusion and Inclusion Through the 
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2493 (2018) (“Conventional 
approaches to participation and accountability have had mixed results in the context of 
[housing] . . . provision.”).  Rahman’s discussion is not limited to housing and instead focuses 
on basic necessities, which he sometimes terms “public goods.” See id. at 2450.  Housing does 
not meet the classic definition of a public good, though it is undoubtedly a basic necessity. 
 349. None of this is to suggest that fixing the process can fix the substantive problem of 
massive artificial constraints on housing production (though a more robust planning process 
would, one hopes, force states and local governments to focus on the connection between 
zoning and housing prices).  States ought to narrow local governments’ zoning authority so as 
to remove their ability to constrain supply. See Lemar, supra note 163, at 353. 
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against—public participation.  For example, rather than rely on current 
property owners’ fears about possible property value depression, planners 
can look to data:  “Hedonic regression analysis can measure the effects of 
particular uses—from wind turbines to community gardens—on neighboring 
property values.  Grounding land use decisions in these data represents a 
considerable advance over proceeding by intuition.”350  Effectuating these 
reforms requires returning to the Standard Act’s original distinction between 
zoning decisions and adjustment decisions.351  The planning and zoning 
process ought to be informed, not dictated, by public participation.  There is 
little place for public participation, however, at the time of individual 
development approvals. 
A.  Learning from Other Administrative Processes 
Public participation is important to planning processes, but we should be 
deeply skeptical of public participation’s role in approving any individual 
development proposal.  Introducing public participation requirements at the 
stage of individual development approvals encourages communities to be 
reactive rather than proactive.  It detracts from the planning and zoning 
process by giving angry neighbors an opportunity to kill a project even if the 
project is consistent with state and local law, including laws concerning 
planning and zoning.  The planning process is undermined by inconsistent 
application of law (the plan and the zoning) to fact (a specific development 
proposal). 
Recall the distinction between planning and zoning processes and 
adjustment decisions (development approvals) described in Part II.  As 
described above in Part III, residents can identify problems in their 
neighborhood and their wishes for the neighborhood.  These inputs are 
fundamental to, but should constitute just one component of, the planning 
and zoning process.  But public participation and hearings are less 
appropriate when an individual developer seeks development approvals—a 
variance, special exception, or a rezoning specific to its parcel.  In these 
cases, the code and the zoning enabling act set applicable standards and 
factors that ought to be applied by a neutral arbiter.352 
If the planning process is robust, we should be able to make the 
development approvals process more predictable.353  Most forms of 
development ought to be as-of-right under the zoning resulting from the 
planning process.  Skeptics might point out that development approvals 
processes attract more participation than planning processes do.  That, 
however, is precisely the problem created by the current system.  Under the 
 
 350. Fennell, supra note 142, at 392. 
 351. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 
 352. Contemporary planning processes frequently collapse the distinction between 
planning and zoning—a fundamental problem with contemporary zoning ordinances. See 
supra Part I.B. 
 353. This proposal is consistent with the push for stronger planning, as discussed in Hills 
& Schleicher, supra note 12, at 116–17. 
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current system, there is little incentive to participate in the planning process, 
as the approvals process for any given development, subject to the whims of 
those who choose to testify, does not respect the planning document.  As a 
result, fewer people participate in planning, and those who do participate are 
undermined by later participants in the development approvals process.  If 
the planning process mattered and was less subject to being overruled during 
later development approvals processes, it would attract more attention and 
participation. 
Thankfully, we have an off-the-rack solution.  Like the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act354 (APA), the Model State Administrative 
Procedures Act355 (“Model State APA”) includes public participation, but 
does not rely on participation as a primary legitimating force.  Instead, it 
relies on the agency’s rigorous evaluation of the substance of the decision in 
question, taking into account both public comment and the agency’s 
independent analysis.  Courts considering whether a regulation meets the 
requirements of the APA look to whether there is reasoned decision-making, 
consistent with the authorizing statute, for the regulation.356 
Similarly, legislatures, local governments, and courts ought to distinguish 
between rulemaking (zoning regulations) and contested cases (development 
approvals) in the land use context.  Undoing the collapsed distinction requires 
both changing formal rules regarding public participation and trusting the 
planning process enough to permit more uses as-of-right in the zoning code.  
As Professor Adam MacLeod argues, in the land use context “courts 
generally fail to distinguish between facial and as-applied challenges, [and] 
between generally-applicable regulations and individualized 
assessments.”357  Like courts, state zoning enabling acts and local agencies 
also ought to recognize the difference between development approvals and 
adopting and amending generally applicable zoning ordinances.  Public 
participation is appropriate in the zoning process but not in the development 
approvals process.358 
With respect to public participation requirements, contemporary zoning 
enabling acts should distinguish between zoning decisions and development 
approvals.  Consistent with the Standard Act and the Model State APA, 
public participation should be welcome at the planning phase and cabined at 
the development approvals phase.  In the planning phase, zoning enabling 
acts ought to identify substantive ends for planning processes359 and require 
that planners and commissioners consider all available data, including public 
 
 354. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559. 
 355. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010). 
 356. Id. § 508 cmt. 
 357. MacLeod, supra note 210, at 55. 
 358. In the development approvals process, participants should meet the standard for 
intervention if they seek to participate. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT 
§ 409. 
 359. MacLeod, supra note 210, at 57 (“[S]tate legislatures should amend their enabling acts 
to require local governments to articulate specific means-ends . . . .”). 
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comment, when making zoning decisions intended to serve those ends.  The 
agency ought to issue written decisions that respond to the comments 
submitted.  At the development approvals phase, most development ought to 
be as-of-right, consistent with the plan.  And where an agency is applying a 
regulation to a specific applicant, as is the case with development approvals, 
public participation is not appropriate.  The conditions of approval ought to 
be objective.  At neither phase should commissioners be permitted to punt 
decision-making to popularity contests in the form of public hearings.  
Robust judicial review must support these changes. 
B.  Planning as Rulemaking 
Public participation requirements are appropriate at the planning stage, 
including adoptions of and revisions to comprehensive plans, zoning codes, 
and zoning maps.  At the planning stage, information received from the 
public can be both vetted and supplemented as part of a more wide-ranging 
rulemaking process. 
1.  The Role of States 
Community control can entrench structural inequality when the 
neighborhoods exercising that control are highly segregated along race and 
class.  Professors Jocelyn Simonson and K. Sabeel Rahman argue that truly 
empowering input must happen “upstream,” at a stage in the administrative 
process when real choices are made.360  When places are segregated and the 
places where poor people live are themselves poor, “upstream” must include 
changes at the state and federal levels, not just at the local and neighborhood 
levels. 
Two things must happen upstream.  First, where statewide interests are at 
stake, some actual policymaking and planning must happen at the state 
level.361  In other words, if the local approvals process constitutes planning 
and dealing, some issues that may otherwise come up in a negotiated result 
should be nonnegotiable because they result in an undersupply of housing or 
other nefarious effects.  Second, the state must lay out local public 
participation requirements and limitations, as proposed in the remainder of 
this part.  Finally, state law must require that local planning is meaningful.  
In order to be meaningful, local plans must be regularly updated, and they 
must address the goals enunciated at the state level.  The resulting plan must 
have the force of law, or the planning process must ensure that the plan is 
immediately translated into an enforceable zoning code.362 
 
 360. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 725–27. 
 361. See Lemar, supra note 163, at 296. 
 362. An example is Minnesota’s Metropolitan Land Planning Act, which included a 
planning requirement that ultimately gave rise to a citywide upzoning in Minneapolis in 
November 2020. Stephen P. Katkov & Jon Schoenwetter, Minneapolis’s Great Experiment:  
An Introduction to the Minneapolis 2040 Comprehensive Plan, BENCH & BAR MINN., Mar. 
2020, at 21, 23. 
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2.  Setting Out Goals and Purposes 
Some zoning enabling acts no longer enumerate purposes of zoning,363 as 
the Standard Act did.364  While the purposes listed in the Standard Act are 
overly broad, states ought to remove vague, easily manipulated purpose 
provisions, such as “consideration as to the character of” the zoning 
community.”365  And they ought to identify data relevant to those purposes, 
such as impacts on housing affordability, public health, and environmental 
impacts, such as vehicle miles traveled.  While the agency will receive 
comments that are unrelated to the inquiry at hand, the Model State APA’s 
requirements that the agency explain the final rule366 and respond to 
comments367 can, in effect, cabin the impulse to subject decision-making to 
a popularity contest.  The process must be able to discern opposition based 
on facts from opposition based on bias or irrational fear.368 
Because zoning is biased in favor of the status quo,369 the planning process 
ought to be framed in terms of change.  What about their community would 
participants like to see improved?  As Warren Logan suggests,370 even when 
they do not have the expertise to posit solutions, residents can identify 
problems which then might be solved through better planning and land use 
decisions.  A planning process that explicitly describes the problem paves the 
way for later determinations of whether the problems have, in fact, been 
solved or exacerbated.  In the context of planning and rezoning decisions, 
 
 363. California and Massachusetts, for example, do not have purposes provisions in their 
zoning enabling acts. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65000–66499.58 (West 2021); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A (2021). 
 364. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 3. 
 365. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2(a) (2021).  Connecticut, at the urging of fair housing 
advocates, has enacted legislation that strips from the zoning enabling act authorization for 
towns to adopt zoning provisions aimed at preserving the “character” of their communities, 
recognizing that this overly broad term has been used to perpetuate segregation. See CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2(b)(3) (West 2021) (replacing considerations of “character” with 
considerations of “physical site characteristics”); id. § 8-2(d)(10) (prohibiting municipalities 
from considering neighborhood “character” when reviewing most land use applications).  
However, legislators were so troubled by the removal of “character” considerations in zoning 
that they replaced it with an equally nebulous definition:  “physical site characteristics.” Id. 
§ 8-2(b)(3). 
 366. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 313 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010). 
 367. Id. § 313(1). 
 368. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has described this 
distinction as follows:  “[c]ommunity opposition . . . based on factual concerns (concerns are 
concrete and not speculative, based on rational, demonstrable evidence, focused on 
measurable impact on a neighborhood)” and opposition “based on biases (concerns are 
focused on stereotypes, prejudice, and anxiety about the new residents or the units in which 
they will live).” U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD GUIDANCE, ASSESSMENT OF FAIR 
HOUSING TOOL FOR STATES AND INSULAR AREAS, app. C at 3 (2016).  See infra notes 382–88 
and accompanying text for a discussion of potential lessons one might draw from this tool. 
 369. Bob Ellickson uses the term “frozen neighborhoods” to describe the many ways in 
which planning law works to halt the evolution of urban and suburban places. Ellickson, supra 
note 248, at 1.  In my own work, I have described this phenomenon as “zoning as taxidermy.” 
See generally Lemar, supra note 49. 
 370. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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bureaucrats and commissioners ought to solicit public input widely, from 
within the city limits and beyond.  Logan describes attending community 
festivals and get-togethers to solicit perspectives on local transportation 
infrastructure.371  He does not rely exclusively on traditional public meetings, 
which, he explicitly recognizes, preference the perspectives of “wealthy 
homeowners.”372  There is no reason to preference the neighbors, and 
participation ought to be solicited broadly.  While zoning enabling acts 
require that notice be given to neighbors,373 anyone ought to be able to 
register with the state to receive notice of land use hearings.374  This would 
allow affordable housing advocates, the homebuilders’ lobby, disability 
advocates, advocates for social services agencies, and others to receive notice 
and share their expertise.  Crucially, however, the results of those 
participation processes must be filtered through planners and commissioners 
required to consider factors other than public opinion as presented in the 
public process. 
3.  Inclusive Public Participation 
Traditional public hearings are insufficient and should be supplemented 
with outreach to community organizations, historically disenfranchised 
communities, communities unlikely to attend public hearings, and 
communities susceptible to silencing by traditional public hearings.375  The 
zoning enabling act or zoning ordinance ought to set precise processes for 
outreach and require the planning agency to interrogate whether the 
community engagement process was effective.  The process ought to reach 
those least likely to attend and testify at traditional public hearings through 
outreach at public schools, neighborhood festivals, and religious institutions:  
places where people congregate even if they do not have strong feelings 
about real estate development.  In addition, the participation process must 
rely on data collection requirements to ensure that effective outreach occurs.  
Robust data collection requirements, reviewable by courts, are crucial to 
ensuring that public outreach is effective. 
The substantive rulemaking inquiry must include the opportunity for 
public comment and, at the agency’s discretion, may include a public 
 
 371. See Holder, supra note 226. 
 372. Id.  At an event sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis 
City Councilperson Lisa Bender recounted advising planning staff to talk to people about their 
lives at festivals in addition to holding meetings required by statute.  She also described 
hearing from renters that they would not attend formal hearings because their opinions were 
discounted in those fora. Minneapolis Fed, Fall 2019 Institute Conference—Day 1, YOUTUBE, 
at 3:28 (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRMdqU0IIqs [https://perma.cc/ 
97QL-T7AU]. 
 373. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text. 
 374. Connecticut requires each individual town to make such registries available. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 8-7d(g)(2) (2021).  There is no mechanism for individuals or organizations to 
register with the state.  Instead, one must register with each of 169 towns plus every sub-local 
government—such as fire districts, homeowners’ associations, and beach associations—that 
exercises zoning authority by delegation of the State of Connecticut. 
 375. See supra note 372. 
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hearing.376  The same requirements should apply to zoning decisions.  
Testimony ought to be limited to certain subject matters listed in the zoning 
enabling act.  The Model State APA anticipates that agencies will make 
extensive use of the internet to publicize and receive comments.  In the land 
use context, this mechanism can serve to counter the overinfluence of 
“neighborhood defenders”377 and “homevoters.”378  Even so, in addition to 
receiving public comments, given the politicized context of land use 
decisions, it is likely that local agencies will often choose to hold public 
hearings even though such hearings are, in theory, optional. 
The scope of agency review ought to be broader than simply hosting public 
hearings and channeling public input.379  As is the case in other regulatory 
processes, the planning and zoning process should be accompanied by 
rigorous data collection, including regarding the state’s housing needs.380  
Rigorous data consideration and a judicial review process that ensures that 
decisions are based on data ought to be legitimating forces.  The 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule—adopted pursuant to 
the Fair Housing Act381 by the Obama-era Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and revoked and replaced by Trump’s HUD—can 
serve as a model.382  The AFFH rule “is significant not only as it applies to 
the AFFH mandate but also more broadly as a potentially innovative 
mechanism that could herald experimentation and new approaches to realize 
equity concerns more broadly.”383  The Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) 
rubric required localities that receive certain federal funding to complete a 
detailed analysis, based on data provided by HUD, relating to segregation.384  
The AFH also required significant community engagement including, but not 
 
 376. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 306 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010).  The Model State APA also noted that “Article 2 is intended to 
provide easy public access to agency law and policy that are relevant to agency process.” Id. 
§ 201 cmt. 
 377. See generally EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211. 
 378. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 329. 
 379. The process could require, for example, as Professor Tim Iglesias has proposed, that 
zoning jurisdictions expressly consider impact on housing affordability. See Tim 
Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments:  Opening New Doors for State Housing Regulation 
While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 476–77 (2003) (“The HIA requirement would 
be enacted by state statute to promote this goal.  The statute would consist of procedural 
requirements . . . and an explicit legislative policy that local governments ‘avoid or mitigate 
significant adverse housing impacts whenever it is feasible to do so.’”). 
 380. Surprisingly few states require local governments to consider housing affordability 
and need in their planning and zoning process.  Exceptions include New Jersey and, in recent 
years, California. 
 381. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
 382. Ironically, HUD suspended typical public participation requirements in connection 
with revocation of the AFFH rules. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Secretary 
Carson Terminates 2015 AFFH Rule (July 23, 2020), https://www.hud.gov/press/ 
press_releases_media_advisories/hud_no_20_109 [https://perma.cc/8VWY-NCYK]. 
 383. Katherine M. O’Regan & Kenneth Zimmerman, The Potential of the Fair Housing 
Act’s Affirmative Mandate and HUD’s AFFH Rule, CITYSCAPE:  J. POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., 2019, 
no. 1, at 87, 95. 
 384. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 368, at 2–3. 
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limited to, public hearings.385  The tool also required a description of 
outreach activities, including using “media outlets” and reaching out to 
“organizations” in an effort to reach “populations that are typically 
underrepresented in the planning process.”386  It required an explanation of 
“how these communications were designed to reach the broadest audience 
possible.”387  In addition, the tool required the agency to evaluate the success 
of its outreach efforts.388 
One can imagine a similar tool—to be completed in the process of 
rendering zoning decisions—that would require substantial engagement with 
the actual impacts of planning and development, rather than the perceived 
risks of changing the status quo.389  Just as existing regulatory processes 
typically require a fiscal impact analysis or a small business impact 
statement, in the planning and zoning context, a state statute might require 
agencies to conduct housing affordability and fair housing analyses.390  The 
analysis ought to consider the impact of a proposed change, as well as the 
impact of doing nothing. 
 
4.  Reasoned Explanations 
Under the Model State APA, following receipt of public comment, an 
agency must issue a final rule, accompanied by an explanatory statement that 
responds to “substantial arguments made in testimony and comments.”391  
Only then is the regulation entitled to judicial deference.  Similarly, the AFH 
rubric required agencies to “[i]nclude a summary of any comments or views 
not accepted and the reasons why.”392  The requirement that the agency 
explain its reasoning and respond to the arguments is key. 
Narrowing the scope of testimony, as permitted by the Model State APA’s 
evidentiary rules,393 does not address the problem of veracity.  Therefore, 
 
 385. Id. at 1. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. See id. 
 389. Consider, for example, the housing impact statement advocated for in Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 
81, 127 (2011), or the requirement, proposed by South Central Los Angeles-based activist 
coalition UNIDAD, that cumulative development approvals result in no net loss of affordable 
units. See THE PEOPLE’S PLAN:  EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR SOUTH LOS ANGELES 13 
(2017), http://www.unidad-la.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/peoples-plan-report-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B9N-LHTG]. 
 390. See Iglesias, supra note 379, at 477 (discussing hypothetical state statutes that would 
require housing impact analyses). 
 391. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 313 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010).  This requirement echoes the requirements of the federal 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires “[a]ny state or local government that forbids 
the placement of a wireless service facility must state its reasons in writing and must support 
its reasoning with ‘substantial evidence.’” MacLeod, supra note 210, at 84 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)). 
 392. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 368, at 1. 
 393. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 404(2). 
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rather than allow an individual’s testimony—whether or not true—to stand 
on its own, the process ought to require bureaucrats and commissioners to 
address in writing the substance of all comments made, thus limiting a 
comment’s effect and impact if it is irrelevant or untrue or a resident 
overstates its importance. 
Requiring planners and commissioners to issue reports elucidating the 
results of public participation and the planners’ and commissioners’ 
responses to those comments serves an important documentation role, as 
well.  Urban planning and zoning are marred by over a century of 
segregationist approaches to city and town design.394  Because our towns and 
cities are highly segregated, simply permitting local control to guide 
development decisions can perpetuate segregation.  Planning and zoning 
laws should require planners and commissioners to explain their decisions 
rather than simply say that members of the public supported or did not 
support a particular choice.  If an explanation is not required, there is no 
protection against the possibility that a proposal simply lost a public hearing 
popularity contest. 
Unfortunately, judicial review of zoning decisions, in its current form, 
does not correct for the failures of the public participation process.  Review 
is highly deferential and, in many cases, does not require that the 
decision-making body explain its decision.395  Judges ought to defer only 
where the agency has demonstrable expertise and the agency’s written 
explanation of its decision substantively engages with the comments 
received.396  Professor Nestor M. Davidson, in his analysis of local 
administrative law, argues that judicial review ought to “bolster procedural 
regularity where appropriate, but recognize that informality may have a place 
to play in local administration.”397  In his estimation, “[c]ourts policing the 
somewhat more porous lines between local government and public 
involvement in the work of that level of government should, at a minimum, 
acknowledge that public involvement carries benefits as well as causes for 
concern, with appropriate procedural and ethical safeguards.”398  In the case 
of local land use administration, courts ought to formalize and limit public 
participation in recognition of the role that public participation plays in 
regressive wealth distribution, housing price inflation, and segregation. 
 
 394. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 283, at 53–54; TROUNSTINE, supra note 9, at 205. 
 395. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions:  Lessons 
from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 729–37 (2008)  (collecting cases and 
explaining development of deferential judicial review standard vis-à-vis local zoning 
decisions); see also MacLeod, supra note 210, at 111–12 (proposing that “states should require 
regulatory authorities to state the reasons for their decisions contemporaneous with their 
decisions and might attach to any subsequently promulgated regulations without an 
accompanying statement a presumption of arbitrariness”). 
 396. See Ostrow, supra note 395, at 729–37. 
 397. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 610 (2017). 
 398. Id. at 617. 
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C.  Applying the Rule:  As-of-Right Development 
A robust plan accompanied by predictable zoning ought to lead to more 
as-of-right development.399  If the planning process is robust, it cannot leave 
a door open for the law to be applied inconsistently by allowing deviations 
from the plan guided only by public participation.  The exercise of discretion 
at the development approvals stage undermines the public participation, 
expertise, and data analysis that inform the underlying planning and zoning. 
There are models for more state planning resulting in enhanced rights for 
developers at the local level.  As I have discussed elsewhere, states have 
removed local discretion (and, therefore, local public participation) in 
connection with various land uses—from home-based child care to solar 
infrastructure—determined by state actors to be necessary uses that are too 
often subject to local vetoes unconcerned with broader societal welfare.400  
Similarly, “anti-snob zoning acts” cabin the considerations that can be taken 
into account when local zoning authorities refuse to permit the construction 
of affordable housing, effectively limiting the relevance and scope of public 
participation.401 
There are nascent efforts to build and improve upon these models.  
Recognizing a statewide housing affordability crisis, Oregon recently made 
duplexes and four-family homes developable as-of-right throughout the 
state.402  That is to say, if a proposed residential development meets the 
standard set out in state statute and regulations, the developer can secure a 
permit to build without undergoing a lengthy approvals process accompanied 
by public hearings.  Similarly, fair housing advocates in Connecticut seek to 
require that approvals processes for multifamily housing look like those 
typically applicable to single family housing:  as-of-right administrative 
approvals with no lengthy process and no public hearings.403 
D.  Applying the Rule:  Development Approvals as Contested Cases 
When discretionary approvals cannot be avoided, local zoning codes and 
state zoning enabling acts should set forth clear, objective criteria for the 
issuance of development approvals.  These criteria should be implemented 
without lengthy process and untethered discretion. 
Again, the Model State APA provides a prototype.  Pursuant to the Model 
State APA, contested cases, like development approvals, ask an agency to 
apply existing rules or law to an individual party.404  In contested cases, an 
evidentiary hearing is required if the applicable constitution or statute so 
 
 399. “As-of-right development” is sometimes referred to as “by-right development.” 
 400. Lemar, supra note 163, at 350. 
 401. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-30(g)–8-30(j) (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23 
(2021). 
 402. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.758 (2019). 
 403. See LCO No. 3562, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2020) (working draft). 
 404. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 401, 403, 413 (NAT’L CONF. 
OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010). 
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provides.405  Evidentiary hearings are public but not generally open to public 
participation.406  One may seek to intervene if the applicable statute expressly 
permits or if one has an interest that may be adversely affected by the 
proceeding.407  The same should be true of development approvals. 
The Model State APA does not incorporate the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
but it does set minimum standards for the evidence presented in a contested 
case evidentiary hearing.  The Model State APA requires that evidence be 
relevant and material:  “The presiding officer may exclude evidence in the 
absence of an objection if the evidence is irrelevant, immaterial, unduly 
repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or statutory grounds or on the 
basis of an evidentiary privilege recognized in the courts of this state.”408  In 
the courtroom, evidentiary rules exist to ensure that adjudicators, whether 
judge or jury, are not swayed by irrelevant, inflammatory, or biased 
information.  Consideration of a development approval application ought to 
be similarly rigorous.  Land use public hearings, because they occur before 
laypeople, are more like jury trials than they are like bench trials.  
Commissioners are often elected and, even when appointed, are not typically 
experts in real estate development.409  Excluding irrelevant inflammatory 
testimony is particularly important given that commissioners are more like 
juries than they are like specialized bureaucrats with significant technical 
expertise. 
If an applicant demonstrates in an evidentiary hearing that a proposed 
development meets the requisite criteria, the local agency should grant the 
approvals, just as building permits are issued without lengthy unpredictable 
processes.410  If the development approvals result from a process other than 
the clear application of law to facts established in an evidentiary hearing, the 
planning process, which itself is a statement of public policy informed by 
participation, is diluted.  If developers can rely on the planning process to set 
standards, they can then design their project to meet those standards.  If the 
planning process is not binding, developers are left, instead, to hazard 
guesses as to what project will receive the most positive reception at a public 
hearing, or worse, ignore the democratically adopted plan and purchase 
support from those constituencies most likely to organize and be 
well-received at a public hearing.  Further, the ability to rely on the planning 
process reduces developers’ information costs, increasing the likelihood of 
investment that meets the parameters of the plan and increasing the likelihood 
 
 405. Id. § 102(7). 
 406. Id. § 403(f). 
 407. Id. § 409(a). 
 408. Id. § 404(2). 
 409. Some states have, in recent years, established a training requirement for planning and 
zoning commissioners but most states require no such training, much less professional 
expertise. See infra notes 417–19 and accompanying text. 
 410. While building code and permit issuance processes vary across jurisdictions, generally 
the public is invited to participate when the government seeks to revise the building code but 
there is no opportunity for public input when an individual building permit application is 
submitted. 
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that smaller-scale developers will be able to participate in the development 
process. 
E.  Informality, Empowerment, and Expertise 
I anticipate three primary critiques of my proposal to import the Model 
State APA into land use procedure.  First, much of the perceived legitimacy 
of the current process relies on the degree to which “informality reflects 
community involvement.”411  My proposal to increase as-of-right 
development, some might argue, will dampen community engagement.  
Second, some will argue that my proposal disempowers the powerless, taking 
away a lever that marginalized people have used to secure accountability in 
redevelopment.  Finally, the Model State APA is designed around the 
assumption that the decision-making agency is made up of experts, but 
planning and zoning commissioners are often laypeople with no expertise in 
real estate, development, environmental science, or planning. 
1.  Informality and Legitimacy 
While informality facilitates involvement by some, it does not facilitate 
involvement by all.  Informality aids current residents who have the time and 
privilege to attend local meetings and who are confident that commissioners 
will take their concerns seriously.  Some constituencies may benefit from 
indirect representation.  Processes that permit and give credence to social 
service agencies, housing activists, and economists might better serve the 
interests of people who cannot attend multiple evening meetings at a time of 
day when many towns and cities run infrequent—if any—public transit.  In 
addition, informality disadvantages people who do not meet commissioners’ 
preconceived notions of whose concerns matter in the planning and zoning 
process.  Informality provides no mechanism for choosing between 
competing notions of “what the community wants.” 
Informality functions best as a substitute for direct referenda, in cases 
where “[local] agencies serve less as a repository of technical expertise and 
more as a mediating body to channel local input and knowledge.”412  As 
described above, however, local input is often one-sided, local knowledge is 
questionable, and many land use questions are technical ones that require 
informed assessment of a regulation’s impact.  In the case of many planning 
and zoning questions, local agencies do not channel local knowledge so much 
as they delegate decision-making authority to a private body, a homeowners’ 
cartel.  A formalized administrative process, one aspect of which is a 
functional public participation mechanism open to all, not just current 
homeowners, is much preferable. 
 
 411. Davidson, supra note 397, at 573. 
 412. Id. at 573–74. 
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2.  Securing Accountability 
Sometimes informal approvals processes work to the benefit of historically 
disempowered groups.  Professor Scott Cummings describes powerful 
coalitions of environmental organizations, labor unions, and low-income 
communities of color uniting to contest development applications and secure 
community benefits agreements in Los Angeles.  These coalitions, unlike the 
homeowners’ cartels described above, are too often temporary.  Alliances are 
not durable and, as Cummings himself describes, these groups’ interests 
often do not align.413  Further, in jurisdictions where, as a result of centuries 
of segregation, there are no low-income people and there are few people of 
color, public participation processes perpetuate segregation. 
While public participation and comment can serve as one accountability 
measure, they are not sufficient to bring accountability to redevelopment 
processes.  Informal processes often empower the already powerful.  True 
accountability requires standards and rules, developed transparently and 
consistently applied throughout the process.  Relying on the exercise of 
political pressure at the end of an informal process is not likely to serve 
progressive values.  There is, in the land use context, a “need to reform 
democratic institutions in ways that better balance political power,”414 but 
informal participation processes are unlikely to serve those ends. 
Certainly, participants in the local land use process do not all share the 
same motivations, and some might deserve our sympathies more than others. 
The fact that a participant is more sympathetic, however, does not mean that 
the participant’s testimony is factually accurate (recall Walter Logan’s 
distinction between people’s ability to describe problems versus their ability 
to solve them).415  Instead, it is appropriate to include, in the purposes set out 
in the zoning enabling act, housing affordability, environmental justice, 
transportation equity, and involuntary displacement.  And it is imperative that 
decision-makers rigorously evaluate the impact of their decisions.  Relying 
on the public participation process to advance these goals is at odds with the 
empirical evidence on how these processes operate. 
3.  Expertise 
The law applicable to administrative processes is designed to defer to 
reasoned decisions informed by expertise.  Not only are planning and zoning 
officials generally not required to explain their reasoned decisions, planning 
and zoning officials are typically laypeople.416  Indeed, recognizing that 
these officials are typically laypeople, sometimes elected rather than 
 
 413. See SCOTT CUMMINGS, AN EQUAL PLACE:  LAWYERS IN STRUGGLE FOR LOS ANGELES 
257 (2021). 
 414. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 693. 
 415. See Holder, supra note 226. 
 416. See Ostrow, supra note 395, at 735–36 & n.78. 
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appointed, New Jersey,417 South Carolina,418 and New York419 have, in 
recent years, mandated training for land use officials. 
That land use officials lack expertise, however, is not a reason for a more 
informal process.  Instead, it is a reason to set tighter standards through the 
planning process and to allow less discretion and fewer popularity contests 
at the development approvals level.  Commissioners’ lack of expertise 
otherwise empowers public participants whose public hearing testimony is 
not vetted by any expert agency. 
CONCLUSION 
The unmitigated desire for more and more public participation can tie 
scholars and advocates into knots.  For example, one writer, in the same 
article, decries both variances, because they are at odds with community 
preference as expressed in zoning code, and as-of-right development, 
because it does not provide the opportunity for project-specific public 
input.420  If you cannot build things permitted by the code and you cannot 
build things not permitted by the code, what’s left?  Nothing.  While some 
may be well served by the status quo bias embedded in our land use planning 
laws, most are not.  Fixing broken public participation processes is a small 
but necessary piece of fixing our broken zoning laws. 
 
 417. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-8 (West 2021) (requirement adopted in 2005). 
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